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Article

The Normative Fourth Amendment
Matthew Tokson†
INTRODUCTION
The concept of a Fourth Amendment “search” is important
to both law enforcement officers and the citizens they may surveil. The Amendment classically requires officers to obtain a
warrant before engaging in a search,1 and even the exceptions to
this rule typically demand probable cause.2 By contrast, when
an investigative practice is not a search, the government can use
it to investigate any citizen without meaningful constitutional
regulation.3
Yet the definition of a “search” has changed dramatically
over time and remains contested today. Currently, searches are
largely defined by the Katz test, which looks to whether a person
had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the thing searched.4
† Associate Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.
Thanks to Shima Baradaran Baughman, Jeffrey Bellin, Paul Cassell, Dan Epps,
Chad Flanders, Aya Gruber, Eve Hanan, Cathy Hwang, Margot Kaminsky,
Orin Kerr, Michael Mannheimer, Sandra Mayson, Cliff Rosky, Stephen Ross,
Christopher Slobogin, Lawrence Solum, James Stern, Lior Strahilevitz, and all
workshop participants at Vanderbilt, Ohio State, Utah, the Ruth Bader Ginsburg Clerks in Academia Workshop, the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Workshop, and the CrimFest Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Christian Clark and Jennifer Joslin for excellent research
assistance. Copyright © 2019 by Matthew Tokson.
1. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533 (2019) (asserting
that the Fourth Amendment “normally requires a warrant for a lawful search”).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 465 U.S. 798, 799 (1982) (“[A] warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause
to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925))).
3. For example, the government lawfully gathered millions of citizens’ dialed phone numbers following Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979),
which held that obtaining such information was not a search.
4. E.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (quoting Katz v.

741

742

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:741

This expectations-based test expanded the scope of the Fourth
Amendment beyond physical things and helped solve the problem of rampant government wiretapping in the mid-twentieth
century.5 But it has given rise to a host of new problems and has
become one of the most widely disparaged tests in all of American law.6 The test is tautological,7 incoherent,8 ignores important Fourth Amendment values,9 gives judges free reign to
impose their policy preferences,10 and, as a practical matter, is
notoriously unhelpful.11 It has failed to protect privacy in many
digital forms of information,12 will shrink the Fourth Amendment’s scope as knowledge of privacy threats increases,13 and is
increasingly useless in the Internet age.14 These problems stem
from a core deficiency: societal expectations are difficult to assess
and offer a shaky foundation for the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Katz, in short, is poorly suited to regulating government
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1867) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Investigations
involving the physical touching of property for information-gathering purposes
typically require a warrant under a new and evolving sub-rule. See Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06
(2012).
5. Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581, 583–84, 584 n.13 (2011).
6. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985); Morgan Cloud, Rube
Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology and the
Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 28–29 (2002); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a
Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints
of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 120–21 (2002); Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails
into Katz’s Coffin, 65 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 413, 413 (2014); Jed Rubenfeld,
The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2008); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman” ’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and
Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1791 (1994).
7. William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1824–25 (2016).
8. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511,
1511 (2010).
9. William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1021 (1995).
10. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. Id.; see Solove, supra note 8, at 1522–24.
12. E.g., Colb, supra note 6, at 132–39; Etzioni, supra note 6, at 421–22.
13. Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 139, 187 (2016).
14. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1325–26 (2012).
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surveillance in the modern world. The Supreme Court itself has
begun to recognize the deficiencies of the current regime, holding
in Carpenter v. United States that the Fourth Amendment protects against cell phone location tracking despite the fact that
cell phone location data is not “private” and is exposed to thirdparty companies.15 As the Court starts to move beyond the strictures of the Katz test, the time is right to rethink how the Fourth
Amendment applies to modern surveillance practices.
But while critiques of the Katz test are legion, concrete alternatives are rare. There is a growing recognition that the question of the Fourth Amendment’s scope is inescapably normative;
it requires courts to make a value judgment about when the
Fourth Amendment should protect citizens’ privacy rather than
simply determining whether citizens generally expect privacy.16
A number of scholars have accordingly argued that courts should
take a more normative approach to the Fourth Amendment.17
But little progress has been made towards developing an actual
normative test, beyond simply calling for courts to create one.18
This Article takes a different approach. It develops a specific, detailed normative model for determining the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. The model is grounded in contextual theories of surveillance, which focus on the specific activities and
communications that surveillance disrupts. It draws on Fourth
Amendment precedents that reflect many of the same concerns,
which are sometimes lost in the futile search for societal expectations. And it addresses a literature that has received relatively
little attention in Fourth Amendment scholarship, encompassing numerous studies of the measurable harms of surveillance to
its targets.19

15. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–20 (2018).
16. Note that the terms “citizens” or “people” used below encompass resident aliens, although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled that the Fourth
Amendment applies to such persons. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to nonresident aliens but noting that similar protections apply to residents);
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (assuming without deciding
that the Fourth Amendment applied to an undocumented immigrant present in
the United States).
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See infra Part I.B.2.c.

744

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:741

Drawing on these sources, the normative model breaks out
surveillance harms into three categories: (1) avoidance of activities because of fear of surveillance; (2) harm to relationships and
communications; and (3) direct psychological or physical harm.
These harms are measurable and often well-documented.20 Yet
they are also easier for judges to intuit in difficult cases than
concepts like societal knowledge or expectations.21
On the other side of the balance are the benefits of crime
detection and prevention. This inquiry would consider, for instance, whether a surveillance technique would primarily be
used in the early stages of an investigation in order to build probable cause, and whether it would be likely to reveal criminal activity that would otherwise be impossible to detect.22 A normative test would also examine whether the same information
might be obtained through less invasive means.23 Considering
these factors, if a surveillance practice causes harms to individuals that outweigh the benefits from enhanced law enforcement,
courts should hold that the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant, or satisfy an exception to the warrant
requirement, before conducting the surveillance.
The goal of the proposal is to move past mere critique of the
Katz test and towards formulating a workable replacement, one
that is better able to address the ever-changing landscape of
modern surveillance. Like any legal regime, the normative
model is hardly perfect, and potential objections to it are addressed in detail below.24 But there are numerous theoretical
and practical reasons to favor a normative approach.25 A normative balancing test reflects the values at the heart of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence more fully and effectively than other
approaches. It is likewise consistent with the text and history of
the Fourth Amendment.26 Indeed, both the leading originalist
interpretation of the Amendment and less formalist theories of
construction support a balancing approach to the crucial ques-

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 128–33.
See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 95.
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.3.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
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tion of when the government can engage in suspicionless surveillance.27
The functional advantages of the normative test are substantial, and arguably essential, for addressing modern surveillance practices. The test is, for example, adaptable to new surveillance technologies and new social contexts. It takes into
account harms that other approaches ignore, including coercion
and discrimination. It is far better suited to addressing programmatic surveillance and data analysis. And it directly considers
the normative values at stake in Fourth Amendment cases,
avoiding the false targets and arbitrariness of alternative tests.28
Moreover, the test can be applied to a variety of Fourth
Amendment questions that courts and scholars struggle with
under current law. It can offer clear answers in frontier cases
such as those involving internet browsing data, smart home
technology, or email content. The normative approach can also
help rehabilitate some widely criticized cases that have plausible
outcomes but dubious reasoning. Finally, the test can help identify flawed cases that are ripe for reversal, where the normative
balance tilts sharply in favor of privacy or surveillance but current law leads courts to the opposite outcome.29
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the normative model in detail and traces its lineage in Fourth Amendment precedent and surveillance theory. Part II discusses the
textual, historical, and theoretical foundations of a balancing approach to the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Part III examines the
many practical advantages of the normative approach. Part IV
addresses potential objections to the normative test and to balancing tests in general. It also examines an alternative approach
that looks to positive law as the basis for the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Part V applies the normative model to resolve frontier cases, provide firmer support for poorly reasoned
cases, and identify deeply flawed cases suitable for reversal.

27. See infra Part II.B.
28. Additional advantages are discussed infra Part III.
29. See infra Part V.

746

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:741

I. TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
A. THE KATZ TEST AND THE NEED FOR NORMATIVITY
The Supreme Court established that a Fourth Amendment
search occurs when a government act violates an individual’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”30 This standard derives
from Justice Harlan’s solo concurrence in the 1967 case Katz v.
United States.31 The Court has largely failed to clarify what
makes an expectation of privacy “reasonable,” and the rationales
of its Katz cases are often contradictory.32 In some cases, the
Court looks primarily to the probability of detection by the police, while in others it looks to positive law or amorphous policy
considerations.33 The law of the Katz test has, to date, been
largely case-dependent and unpredictable.34
30. E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). The Supreme
Court has recently adopted a sub-test that finds a Fourth Amendment search
when a government official physically intrudes on property for the purposes of
gathering information. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012). This has, thus far, added little to
the Katz test, and the Supreme Court cases where it has been employed would
likely have reached the same outcome under Katz. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–16
(Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). It has also rapidly become confusing and difficult to apply, as the Court
has had to determine the extent of an implied social license to enter the curtilage of a home—a question bound up in a social norms inquiry even more amorphous and confusing than the Katz test. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10; George M.
Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines Refuses to Reconcile Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing
on Physical Trespass, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 471–79 (2014).
31. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). This approach was
quickly adopted by lower courts and the Supreme Court as the definitive test.
E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that . . . wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government intrusion.” (quoting Katz, 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring))); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421
F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970) (considering whether defendant had a “reasonable
‘expectation of privacy’” when crossing the border from Mexico to California
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 9)).
32. E.g., Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60
STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2007); Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
33. Kerr, supra note 32, at 50722.
34. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and
the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHNS
L. REV. 1149, 115358, 1166 (1998).
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Criticism of the Katz test began not long after its adoption
and has only grown in volume and intensity over the years.35
Critics argue that a test based on expectations is unworkable
and tautological.36 They note the potential for circularity, as societal expectations about privacy may be shaped by government
practices and judicial decisions.37 They point out that courts are
poorly situated to assess societal views about privacy.38 Moreover, an expectations-based Fourth Amendment will shrink over
time as knowledge of privacy threats increases.39
For decades, and increasingly often in recent years, scholars
have called upon courts to take a more normative approach.40
Such an approach would focus on the level of privacy that citizens should have rather than how much privacy they expect.41
Calls for a normative approach to the Fourth Amendment
sometimes follow broad critiques of the Katz test,42 but they also
arise in narrower works examining new surveillance technologies.43 These analyses are generally insightful. Yet these divergent writings share a profound humility regarding the content
35. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Foreword, Perplexing Questions About Three
Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause,
and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 425, 429 (1978);
sources cited supra note 6.
36. Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1824–25.
37. E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 13233.
38. Solove, supra note 8, at 152122.
39. E.g., Tokson, supra note 13, at 187.
40. See, e.g., Catherine Hancock, Warrants for Wearing a Wire: Fourth
Amendment Privacy and Justice Harlan’s Dissent in United States v. White, 79
MISS. L.J. 35, 3638 (2009); Justin Holbrook, Communications Privacy in the
Military, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 831, 903 (2010); Neil Richards, The ThirdParty Doctrine and the Future of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 148788
(2017); Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 82–83 (2000); Olivier
Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total
Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 522 (2014); James J. Tomkovicz,
Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth
Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 698 (1985).
41. E.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What
Katz Is Made of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 795 (2008) (“At some level the
constitutional inquiry must concern not just what society actually believes is
private, but what we ought to be able to regard as private . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 40, at 698.
43. See, e.g., Skok, supra note 40, at 8283. Justice Harlan himself called
for a more normative approach, repudiating in part the Katz test that he had
created, in a case involving an undercover government agent’s recording of a
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of a normative test. They note “[t]he difficulty [in] determining
the right normative formula,”44 clarify that the general normative approach they favor is “fact-driven” and imprecise,45 or explain that “[i]n this initial effort it would be futile to attempt to
provide closure on the subject of possible grounds” for a normative test.46 More commonly, they simply urge courts to take a
normative approach and reach the correct results in various
cases, without explaining what such an approach would entail.47
A few scholars have taken a descriptive approach, examining
federal and state cases post-Katz and identifying factors that
seem to correlate with Fourth Amendment violations (such as
intrusiveness) or that are generally relevant to privacy (such as
the nature of the information sought).48 But these correlates
have not yielded a test, except perhaps a “totality of the circumstances” test that directs courts to weigh any relevant normative
considerations and reach the best outcome.49
conversation. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. Gruber, supra note 41, at 836.
45. Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a
Digital Age, 80 MISS. L.J. 1035, 1091 (2011).
46. Tomkovicz, supra note 40, at 703.
47. See, e.g., Skok, supra note 40, at 8283; Sylvain, supra note 40, at 522.
48. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy,
2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007) (discussing intrusive searches); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV.
647, 722–23 (1988) (discussing generalities relevant to privacy); Stephen E.
Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party
Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 985–
1014 (2007) (listing considerations relevant to privacy).
49. Henderson, supra note 48, at 985–1014, 1025 (noting several nondispositive considerations relevant to privacy and affirming the importance of a
“totality of the circumstances” approach to the Fourth Amendment). Paul Ohm
has described Carpenter v. United States as radically changing the Katz test
itself and virtually replacing it with the standard for cell phone data set out in
Carpenter, which looks to the “the deeply revealing nature of [cell phone data],
its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection.” Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter,
32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 361–63 (2019); see Carpenter v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18, 2223 (2018). Even assuming that this standard is now
controlling in the third-party doctrine context, it is unlikely that the Court intended it to modify Katz. Indeed, the Court took pains to avoid providing any
guidance on future Fourth Amendment issues, emphasizing that “[o]ur decision
today is a narrow one” and listing several Fourth Amendment issues (including
those closely related to historical cell phone data) on which the Court expressed
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What explains the reluctance to specify how courts should
normatively determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment?
One of the earliest and most illuminating calls for a normative
approach, from James Tomkovicz’s 1985 article, suggests that
the difficulty of formulating a normative test stems in part from
the difficulty of conceptualizing the harms that government surveillance can cause.50 Tomkovicz offers no test and notes that
there are “no ready guides” for value judgments regarding citizens’ privacy, but posits that as theories of privacy and related
constitutional values develop, courts could incorporate their conclusions into a normative approach.51
Several decades later, the time has come to incorporate the
insights of privacy and surveillance theory into a concrete
Fourth Amendment test. Such theory has made enormous progress over the past thirty years and in a variety of fields, including law, sociology, philosophy, and information science. Among
other developments, privacy theory has largely shifted from
identifying abstract principles of privacy towards focusing on the
specific practices, communications, and freedoms that privacy
enables.
Scholars have offered various general theories of privacy, including privacy as control over information,52 limited exposure

no opinion. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. Still, Ohm’s point is well taken that
Carpenter might serve as a basis for a rethinking of the Katz test. See Ohm,
supra, at 36163. I have elsewhere argued that the Carpenter and United States
v. Jones opinions reflect the Court’s recognition of factors that have long dictated its application of Katz. See Tokson, supra note 32, at 18–20.
50. Tomkovicz, supra note 40, at 70102.
51. Id. at 70103.
52. E.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the
claim of individuals . . . to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others.”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over
information about ourselves.”).
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to others,53 intimacy,54 bodily integrity,55 and as a precondition
to self-development.56 Yet theorists have increasingly recognized
that the meaning of privacy is rarely fixed or universal, and its
value often depends on the social contexts in which it can protect
individuals from coercion, condemnation, and other harms.57 As
social practices and norms change, different aspects of privacy
can become more or less important. For instance, control over
data may be increasingly important in the Internet era, while
limiting exposure to others may be less of a concern in an age of
larger houses and increasing social isolation. Moreover, some aspects of privacy may be crucial in some contexts and irrelevant
in others.58
In order to develop a more complete account of privacy
harm, theories of contextual privacy have looked to the norms
that govern information exchange in a wide variety of social contexts and relationships.59 When people offer their information in
a certain context, the exchange of information is generally governed by implicit agreements regarding its use.60 These agreements and norms might dictate, for instance, that the parties

53. E.g., SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND
REVELATION 10–11 (1983) (“[P]rivacy [is] the condition of being protected from
unwanted access by others . . . .”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law,
89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
54. E.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 140 (1992)
(“[P]rivacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions . . . .”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 233, 268 (1977).
55. E.g., Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV.
275, 283–84 (1974).
56. E.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723,
739–40 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1653 (1999).
57. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 8089 (2010); Adam Barth et al.,
Privacy and Contextual Integrity: Framework and Applications, 2006 IEEE
SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 184, 184–86 (2006).
58. For example, keeping one’s marital or health status private may be important in the context of a job interview but unimportant in the context of social
interactions with friends or a conversation with a doctor. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 57, at 143–44.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 124–25.
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restrict further information flow or maintain anonymity by declining to link the data with personally identifiable information.61 Violations of these context-dependent norms lead to
identifiable harms, as parties’ preferences are ignored and their
interests adversely affected.62 Thus a clinical worker who disclosed a patient’s treatment for addiction would violate norms of
behavior specific to the treatment context, causing harms to the
patient’s reputation, psychological well-being, employment prospects, etc.
Relatedly, pragmatic privacy theories focus on how the lack
of privacy deters and interrupts specific social and personal practices.63 They posit that the value of privacy depends on the practices that it protects, which include activities as varied as political activism, shopping, communication, research, nudity, and
intimacy.64 Likewise, the concept of intellectual privacy has
called attention to the importance of privacy to expressive activities, personal communications, and freedom of thought itself.65
It reveals a particularly important set of practices and cognition
that surveillance has the potential to disrupt. These and other
recent theoretical movements offer a deeper, more specific, and
more practical understanding of the harms of surveillance. Their
insights can help provide a foundation for a workable normative
approach to the Fourth Amendment.
This Article’s analysis of the harms of government surveillance can help to further develop and refine contextual and pragmatic privacy theories. The Article examines in detail a particularly important privacy context: surveillance by police or other
government officials of private citizens. It identifies the most
fundamental disruptions and harms caused by such surveillance. More broadly, the Article develops an analytical approach
that can be used to evaluate private intrusions and government
surveillance alike.

61. See id. at 186–87.
62. See id. at 212.
63. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087,
112632 (2002).
64. Id. at 1143, 114654.
65. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 41226
(2008).
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The following Sections propose a concrete, normative test for
the Fourth Amendment’s scope and trace the lineage of each factor of the test in surveillance theory, constitutional practice, or
both. Part II then discusses the test’s doctrinal, historical, and
theoretical foundations.
B. A NORMATIVE TEST
An effective normative test for the Fourth Amendment’s
scope would balance the benefits of warrantless government surveillance against its costs. However, a test that merely directs
courts to weigh all benefits to law enforcement against all harms
to citizens is not sufficiently detailed or rigorous. Such a standard would require each individual court to determine how best
to theorize and assess the various harms of surveillance, likely
resulting in extreme inconsistency and prohibitively high decision costs.
Courts require a more concrete, workable test. But, if it is to
reflect the normative balance inherent in the Fourth Amendment, such a test must also incorporate essential categories of
law enforcement benefit and social harm. The following proposal
attempts to fulfill these goals and strike a middle ground between including important categories of surveillance harm and
remaining concise. Its aim is not only to offer a workable test,
but to shift the focus of Fourth Amendment debate away from
criticisms of Katz and toward actual alternatives.
The test can be described as follows:
The normative test asks whether a surveillance practice’s
value to law enforcement in terms of crime detection and prevention outweighs three fundamental harms: (1) the avoidance of
lawful activity because of fear of surveillance; (2) the harm to
relationships and communications caused by observation; and
(3) the concrete psychological or physical harm suffered due to
surveillance. The test then asks whether the same law enforcement goals could be achieved via a less invasive practice. If, considering these factors, the total harm to citizens from a type of
surveillance outweighs the total benefit from enhanced law enforcement, courts should hold that the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant, or to satisfy an exception to the
warrant requirement, before conducting the surveillance. If the
benefit to law enforcement outweighs the harm, then the police
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should be able to conduct the surveillance without Fourth
Amendment regulation.
These three categories of harm are derived not only from
basic Fourth Amendment ideals like privacy, liberty, and security, but also from a consideration of the functional and practical
values these ideals protect.66 The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent arbitrary government surveillance,67 a valuable goal not only in itself but also because such surveillance prevents us from acting freely, stifles our relationships and freedom
of association, and does harm to us both as individuals and as
citizens of a democracy. These practical values are embodied in
the proposed test. Each of the factors has a basis in existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, well-developed theories of
privacy and police coercion, or both. The following Sections discuss the factors in more detail, as well as their doctrinal and theoretical foundations.
1. Crime Detection and Prevention
The first factor of the test examines a warrantless surveillance practice’s benefits to law enforcement, which can primarily
be expressed in terms of enhanced crime detection and enhanced
deterrence.68 Because detection and prevention are generally
linked, the test combines them in a single inquiry.69
66. For a discussion of historical Fourth Amendment ideals, see, for example, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of
[a man’s] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property . . . .”), abrogated by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through
History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1726 (1996) (“[T]he historical record suggests that objections to general warrants and general searches
alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy, property, and liberty
from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions.”).
67. E.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 74445 (1999).
68. It would also encompass evidence collection for the purposes of conviction, which would have benefits related to detection, deterrence, incapacitation,
and retribution.
69. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 883–84 (2001) (studying drinking and
driving trends among college students and finding that the certainty of punishment was a stronger deterrent than the severity of punishment). Courts might
optionally prefer to analyze these facts of law enforcement separately, breaking
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This factor essentially asks, how valuable to law enforcement would it be to be able to engage in a certain type of warrantless surveillance? A court might consider whether a surveillance technique would primarily be used in the early stages of
investigations, before probable cause has been developed, and
whether the warrantless use of the technique would likely reveal
criminal activity that would otherwise go undetected.70 For example, if obtaining certain financial records without a warrant
would allow police to identify white collar crimes that would otherwise be difficult to detect, that would weigh in favor of excluding such records from Fourth Amendment regulation.71 Relatedly, courts could consider studies examining the effects of
limiting a particular surveillance technique. Research indicating
that limits on certain kinds of surveillance would reduce police
ability to build probable cause72 or to deter certain crimes73 may
help to quantify the value of the surveillance to law enforcement

this factor out into two separate factors on the law enforcement side of the balance.
70. Courts could also consider relevant studies examining the effects of limiting various surveillance techniques. One recent study, for instance, found that
subjecting telephone call logs to a warrant requirement resulted in fewer applications for wiretaps and a decrease in the duration of permitted wiretaps. ANNE
E. BOUSTEAD, POLICE, PROCESS, AND PRIVACY: THREE ESSAYS ON THE THIRD
PARTY DOCTRINE 18–20 (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/
RGSD384.html [https://perma.cc/3KFX-U299]. Its findings suggest that regulating the acquisition of call log data reduces police officers’ ability to obtain
sufficient probable cause for Wiretap Act applications. Id.
71. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 509 (2011) (explaining that the Supreme
Court eliminated the warrant requirement for financial records following the
rise of difficult-to-detect white-collar crimes); see also David Gray et al.,
Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 777–78, 798 (2013) (discussing types of digital evidence that are especially helpful in detecting healthcare fraud and cyber harassment).
72. See BOUSTEAD, supra note 70, at 1820.
73. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What Caused the 2016 Chicago
Homicide Spike? An Empirical Examination of the ‘ACLU Effect’ and the Role
of Stop and Frisks in Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1581, 1665
(2018) (noting an increase in gun violence in the year following the cessation of
programmatic stop-and-frisk searches in Chicago); see also Gary T. Marx, Seeing Hazily (But Not Darkly) Through the Lens: Some Recent Empirical Studies
of Surveillance Technologies, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 339, 348–49 (2005) (discussing the deterrent effects of video monitoring in interrogation rooms on violence
by both detainees and the police).
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goals. Reports issued by agencies tasked with independent evaluation, such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
may also be helpful in assessing law enforcement efficacy.74
The consideration of law enforcement effectiveness is
grounded in Fourth Amendment caselaw, although courts’ treatment of it has been haphazard and unstructured. The Supreme
Court has explicitly considered benefits to law enforcement in
cases concerning the Fourth Amendment’s scope,75 and such
benefits implicitly justify the results in countless other scope
cases.76 This consideration also helps determine the effective
scope of the Amendment by shaping and limiting its remedies.77

74. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 111821 (2016) (explaining that the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board has access to classified information and can consult a wide breath of institutional and public opinion).
75. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346–47 (2009) (mentioning the evidentiary interests of the police as a justification for maintaining a broad scope
for the vehicular search incident to arrest doctrine); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526–27 (1984) (discussing the need for decreased privacy rights for inmates
in their cells due to the importance of detecting inmate crimes in a prison setting); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976) (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 1829b(a)(1) (1970)) (noting the “high degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and
regulatory investigations and proceedings” of bank record availability for law
enforcement).
76. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 9091 (1998) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to temporary house guests who are not
personal friends of the homeowner, in a case involving a drug sale); California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (concluding that police officers are entitled to view a house’s curtilage from any place where citizens can lawfully go,
including airspace); see also United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 43941
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding that no warrant is required to collect a U.S. citizen’s
emails to an overseas foreign national, when that foreign national is subject to
a lawful search, in a case involving allegations of terrorism).
77. For example, the “good-faith exception” cases limit the application of
the exclusionary rule in large part because of the rule’s detrimental effects on
law enforcement and criminal deterrence. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v.
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 36465 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he
exclusionary rule . . . allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the consequences of their actions . . . . [T]he rule’s costly toll upon truthseeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.”). Courts grant qualified immunity to law enforcement officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment for similar reasons. See,
e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (justifying qualified immunity in part on concerns that a lack of immunity would deter law enforcement
officers from performing their duties to the full extent).
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At the level of theory, some concern for effective law enforcement is inherent in the existence of criminal laws. The theoretical justifications for criminal law enforcement are largely identical to those that justify criminal laws and punishments—the
utilitarian benefits of deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation;78 the deontological values of justice and retribution;79 or a
pragmatic mixture of both.80 Any normative balancing approach
to regulating law enforcement must take law enforcement effectiveness into account.
2. Harms to Individuals
As discussed above, a workable normative test must capture
the most substantial harms caused by government surveillance
and be sufficiently administrable that judges can effectively apply the test.81 Contextual and pragmatic theories of surveillance
point the way towards a test that can meet both needs. They focus on the particular practices and relationships disrupted by
surveillance.82 This practical emphasis has several benefits.
First, it can unify various theories of privacy and other Fourth
Amendment values like liberty and trust by emphasizing their
shared practical concerns rather than their abstract theoretical
differences.83 Second, the practical harms of surveillance are easier for judges to address than are esoteric theories of privacy or
trust.84
The normative test proposed here combines a focus on disrupted practices and relationships with another category of fundamental harms: measurable psychological or physical harms
suffered by the subjects of government investigations. By incorporating these factors, the test can capture the primary harms
78. E.g., Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727,
729 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000).
79. E.g., Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 815, 826–28 (2007) (discussing “desert-based punishment” and necessity of punishment for “those who deserve it”).
80. E.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Lifting the Veil on Punishment, 7 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 443, 449–50 (2004) (“The mixed theory . . . unites the purpose of utilitarianism with the limits of retribution.”).
81. See supra Part I.B.
82. See supra notes 6571 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Solove, supra note 63 (discussing the theoretical differences between the leading privacy theories).
84. Id. at 1090 (discussing the difficulties judges face when conceptualizing
privacy).
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to individuals from government surveillance without requiring
judges to grapple with abstract theories or societal expectations.
Although the test focuses on the pragmatic harms of surveillance, its focus is necessarily broad, addressing the surveillance
technique used in the relevant case as a whole rather than in
isolation. It does so by hypothesizing that the surveillance technique has become widespread and well-known, and asking how
people’s behavior would change as a result. This comprehensive
approach is necessary for several reasons. First, a broad approach to the harms of surveillance is necessary to match the
broad consideration of law enforcement benefits. The Supreme
Court frequently considers the general benefits of surveillance
to law enforcement, benefits that go beyond those realized in the
instant case.85 Courts should likewise consider the widespread
harms of surveillance when evaluating potential Fourth Amendment searches.86 Second, predicting the exact future prevalence
of a surveillance technique or determining the likely extent of
societal knowledge would be very difficult, especially for courts
addressing novel surveillance technologies.87 Finally, a broad assessment better aligns courts’ analyses with the potential consequences of their decisions.88 Fourth Amendment cases nearly always have broad implications. When a court rules that the police
may dig through one defendant’s trash bags without a warrant,
the police can thereafter dig through the trash bags of any person in the court’s jurisdiction.89 By assessing surveillance techniques as a whole, the normative test appropriately focuses
courts’ attention on the actual impacts of their decisions.

85. See supra notes 75, 77.
86. See discussion infra Parts I.B.2.bc.
87. See Tokson, supra note 13, at 16479 (discussing the difficulties of
measuring societal knowledge in even the most favorable circumstances).
88. See, e.g., infra notes 23941 and accompanying text.
89. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). Resource constraints may prevent police departments from engaging in costly surveillance
on a grand scale. For lower-cost types of surveillance or for national security
matters, however, the government might actually surveil most or all citizens.
Thus, courts might safely assume that the use of a costly surveillance technique
would be less widespread than that of a cheap technique, potentially affecting
the extent of the harm caused. For a detailed argument regarding surveillance
costs and the importance of assessing surveillance technologies as a whole, see
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 62, 10103 (2013).
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a. Deterring Lawful Activities
The first harm factor asks whether a given type of surveillance would cause people to avoid lawful activities. People engage in all manner of potentially sensitive, embarrassing, or controversial activities, like visiting a psychiatrist, researching
sensitive subjects online, purchasing certain drugs or medical
equipment, joining a substance-abuse support group, or criticizing government or social elites. These lawful activities can be
deterred by the threat of surveillance. For example, Google
searches for especially controversial or embarrassing terms decreased significantly following Edward Snowden’s disclosure of
an NSA program capable of capturing internet information.90
Likewise, researchers documented a reduction in a wide variety
of religious and social activities at New York mosques due to increased police surveillance after the September 11 attacks.91
Courts may assess deterrence of lawful activities by using
studies that show reduced activity following increased awareness of surveillance.92 Empirical studies on chilling effects have

Further, courts applying a normative test would primarily focus on the domestic law enforcement context but could also consider the domestic anti-terrorism context if doing so is helpful. By contrast, foreign intelligence surveillance may be exempt from the warrant requirement in any event, potentially
making the question whether such surveillance is a “search” irrelevant. See generally United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913–15 (4th Cir. 1980)
(concluding that “the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant
each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance,” but noting that those
reasons do not justify warrantless domestic surveillance).
90. See Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and
Internet Search Behavior 7, 3536 (Feb. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564 (explaining embarrassing search terms were identified by poll respondents and included “abortion,” “gender reassignment,” “police brutality,” and “tax avoidance”).
91. See DIALA SHAMAS & NERMEEN ARASTU, MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
COAL. ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN
MUSLIMS 1215 (2013), http://www.law.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/page
-assets/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8PCY-8583].
92. See, e.g., Marthews & Tucker, supra note 90; Jonathon W. Penney,
Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 117, 14657 (2016) (finding that views of Wikipedia articles on sensitive
topics decreased significantly following the Snowden revelations); see also MICHAEL MCCAHILL, THE SURVEILLANCE WEB: THE RISE OF VISUAL SURVEILLANCE IN AN ENGLISH CITY 145 (2002) (discussing the effects of video monitoring
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become increasingly common in recent years.93 Courts may also
rely on expert witnesses or amicus briefs from professional associations noting the lawful activities that a type of surveillance
may discourage, as the Supreme Court did in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston.94
Moreover, judges are likely to be able to assess deterrence of
lawful activities even in situations where there are no directly
relevant studies. Whether surveillance would deter a person
from engaging in lawful activities is a question that judges can
fruitfully address through reasoning and intuition: “if I were being surveilled by government agents using the technique at issue
in this case, would I be likely to forego certain activities?” For
example, a judge assessing long-term video monitoring by drones
might recognize that she would likely curtail her activities in
public and in the back yard of her home because of the monitoring. This likely reduction in lawful activity would weigh in favor
of requiring a warrant for long-term drone surveillance. Judges
are likely to be more successful in forming intuitions about how
their own activities would be impacted by surveillance than
grappling with abstract theories of privacy or attempting to calculate societal expectations.95
on the social behavior of mall security guards); Darhl M. Pedersen, Psychological Functions of Privacy, 17 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 147, 15052 (1997) (presenting
survey results evaluating everyday activities that depend upon privacy).
93. See, e.g., PEN AM. CTR, CHILLING EFFECTS: NSA SURVEILLANCE
DRIVES U.S. WRITERS TO SELF-CENSOR 3 (2013) (reporting that 28% of surveyed
writers had curtailed social media activities out of concerns about surveillance,
while 16% had avoided writing or speaking about certain subjects); Jonathon
W. Penney, Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A
Comparative Case Study, 6 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 1–3 (2017) (reporting survey evidence that government surveillance of the internet would reduce online
speech, make speakers more guarded in terms of the content of their online
speech, and chill online searching).
94. 532 U.S. 67, 84 n.23 (2001) (noting that the American Medical Association and other groups filing amicus briefs agreed that drug testing of pregnant
patients’ urine would deter women who use drugs from seeking prenatal care).
95. One might object that judges applying the Katz test can already use
personal intuitions about whether they would expect privacy. Aside from the
myriad problems with using anyone’s expectations as a barometer for Fourth
Amendment protection, see supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text, judicial intuition regarding privacy expectations is likely to be systematically biased
against privacy interests. See Tokson, supra note 13, at 17273 (describing various cognitive biases that may affect judicial intuitions about privacy expectations). Expectations of privacy are inextricably linked to knowledge regarding
surveillance and privacy threats. See id. at 149–50 (“What a person expects is
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Judicial intuitions are, of course, not infallible and are subject to inaccuracy and bias.96 Social science studies provide more
objective evidence but are likewise imperfect and prone to misinterpretation.97 This Article does not argue that judges will employ either source of information perfectly. It does contend that
judicial intuition is better suited for assessing surveillance’s
dampening effects on activities and relationships than for intuiting the state of societal expectations of privacy.98 Moreover,
there is an extensive social science literature on surveillance
harms that can aid judges in their assessments.99
Courts are likely able to evaluate surveillance’s potential
impact on lawful activities—indeed, they have already done so
in several cases. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court exam-

largely a function of what they know.”). Judges will generally have unusually
high levels of knowledge regarding the surveillance technique at issue—the parties will have informed them at length about the technology in their pleadings
and briefs. Thus, they may expect less privacy in a given context than the vast
majority of people. Further, judges’ acquired knowledge is likely to bias their
intuitive judgments about societal knowledge in general. Individuals tend to
automatically and irrationally impute their own knowledge to other people,
even when those people are extremely unlikely to know it. See Boaz Keysar et
al., States of Affairs and States of Mind: The Effect of Knowledge of Beliefs, 64
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 283, 284 (1995)
(“[O]nce people know what speakers intend, they believe that addressees will
perceive the same intention—even when addressees lack the crucial piece of
information which is necessary to understand the speakers’ intention.”).
96. See Tokson, supra note 13, at 17273 (explaining that by the time
judges decide a case, they have so much knowledge about the issue they may
intuitively overestimate societal knowledge).
97. See J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The
Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 145 (1990).
98. See supra note 95.
99. There is a smaller but growing collection of surveys about surveillance
and privacy expectations that can assist judges in assessing such expectations
under Katz. See Brief of Amici Curiae Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars
in Support of Petitioner at 4–10, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018) (No. 16-402), 2018 WL 3073916 (discussing studies that ask respondents
about their expectations of privacy). Courts have thus far been reluctant to employ such data, and people’s reported expectations may not match their behavior
or may be more aspirational than actual. See Tokson, supra note 13, at 180.
Nonetheless, the use of empirical studies of societal expectations and knowledge
would likely improve the accuracy of courts’ decisions under the Katz test. Id.
However, the many conceptual flaws of the Katz test itself recommend abandoning the test even if courts were able to adjudicate it perfectly. See, e.g., id. at
18187.
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ined whether police searches of newspaper offices would interfere with the newspaper’s operations, dissuade confidential
sources from coming forward, motivate editors to suppress controversial news stories, or “intrude into or to deter normal editorial and publication decisions.”100 Likewise, in cases involving
searches and seizures of expressive materials, the Court has emphasized the need for the rigorous application of Fourth Amendment protections to prevent the stifling of legitimate book distribution or movie displays.101 Nor has this principle been limited
to cases involving expressive activities. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, the Supreme Court held that a public hospital’s program of drug testing pregnant women’s urine violated the
Fourth Amendment, noting that medical professionals apparently agreed that such programs “discourag[ed] women who use
drugs from seeking prenatal care.”102
A concern with the deterrence of legitimate activities also
has roots in pragmatic theories of privacy. Pragmatic theories
explicitly focus on concrete practices and conceive of privacy as
a constitutive part of such practices.103 Accordingly, they define
privacy harms in terms of disruptions to practices.104 In a similar
vein, the theory of intellectual privacy emphasizes surveillance’s
ability to chill activities of intellectual development and expression, from reading library books to web-surfing to writing and
speaking.105 These theories provide a compelling account of the
potential chilling effects of surveillance and the value of privacy100. 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978).
101. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 50405 (1973) (expressing
concerns about police searches and seizures suppressing legitimate displays of
movies); Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 21113 (1964)
(holding that an overbroad warrant was unconstitutional in part because of its
potential for deterring the publication of legitimate books). Justice Sotomayor
recently expressed concern about the potential for surveillance to “chill[ ] . . . expressive freedoms.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
102. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 n.23 (2001).
103. Solove, supra note 63, at 112730.
104. See id. at 1129. An essential characteristic of a pragmatic theory is that
it “focus[es] on the specific types of disruption and the specific practices disrupted rather than looking for the common [theoretical] denominator that links
all of them.” Id. at 1130.
105. See Richards, supra note 65, at 389, 421 (“Intellectual privacy is the
ability . . . to develop ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted gaze or interference of others.”).
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dependent practices. There are, however, other fundamental
harms caused by government surveillance that a Fourth Amendment normative model must incorporate.106
b. Harm to Relationships
The second harm factor asks whether a surveillance practice
would interfere with or diminish interpersonal relationships.
Surveillance might harm such relationships by compromising intimate communications, deterring relationship formation, or diminishing the depth or quality of intimate relationships via the
threat of observation.
Relationships with others are both extremely important to
people’s well-being and particularly dependent on privacy to
flourish.107 An important aspect of personal relationships is “the
sharing of information about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions
which one does not share with all.”108 By protecting such personal information from general observation, “privacy creates the
moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.”109 Surveillance can easily disrupt personal relationships by deterring unfettered communication,110 disrupting intimacy,111 inducing selfconsciousness and self-censorship,112 or causing social embarrassment or condemnation.113

106. See infra Parts I.B.2.bc.
107. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 919, 923–24 (2005).
108. CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL
AND SOCIAL CHOICE 142 (1970).
109. Id.
110. See Richards, supra note 65, at 424 (“Our confidants are a source of new
ideas and information, but without confidentiality they may be reluctant to
share subversive or deviant thoughts with us lest others overhear.”).
111. Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 268–69 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984)
(explaining that surveillance disrupts the development and experience of intimacy by creating pressure of observation).
112. Id.
113. See James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 111, at 29396 (“[S]eparation allows us to behave with certain people in the way that is appropriate to
the sort of relationship we have with them.”); see also Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 13839 (2004) (“[N]orms of
appropriateness dictate what information about persons is appropriate, or fitting, to reveal in a particular context.”).
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If a surveillance technique is likely to prevent people from
expressing private, provocative, or intimate thoughts to each
other, then that would weigh in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment search. Courts may assess a surveillance technique’s impacts on relationships by, for instance, examining studies showing that the technique decreases or diminishes personal
communications.114 Judges can also usefully intuit the impact of
outside surveillance on relationships. The effects of observation
by others on personal communications are generally easy to comprehend. Virtually everyone has had the experience of moderating or ceasing a conversation due to potential overhearing by another such as a parent, teacher, stranger, or co-worker.
The Supreme Court has not expressly analyzed interference
with personal relationships in the Fourth Amendment context,
but it has repeatedly protected personal communications from
government surveillance and emphasized the importance of unfettered discourse. In the majority opinion in Katz, the Court
subjected telephone conversations to a warrant requirement,
grounding its holding in its recognition of “the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication.”115
In one of the earliest Supreme Court Fourth Amendment cases,
the Court declared that sealed letters could not be inspected
without a search warrant.116 Recently, a Sixth Circuit case concluded that the Fourth Amendment should generally protect the
contents of emails, lest it “prove an ineffective guardian of private communication, an essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve.”117 This essential purpose has been obscured to

114. See Carl Botan, Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A
Model for Predicting Panoptic Effects, 63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 307, 309–
10 (1996) (finding that workers under surveillance engaged in fewer personal
communications); R.H. Irving et al., Computerized Performance Monitoring Systems: Use and Abuse, 29 COMM. ACM 794, 799 (1986) (finding computer monitoring to be correlated with a decrease in the quality of peer relationships).
115. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
116. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
117. Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “conversational privacy” (citing
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))).
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some degree by the confusions of the Katz test, but courts continue to protect personal communications even when current
doctrine seems to suggest doing otherwise.118
Outside of Fourth Amendment law, the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of intimate relationships to human
well-being and has vigorously protected these relationships from
unnecessary state interference.119 Laws that might adversely affect marriages, parent-child relationships, non-marital romantic
relationships, cohabitation, and others have been struck down
as unconstitutional infringements on intimate relationships.120
The Court’s longstanding recognition of the importance of these
relationships provides another basis for weighing harm to such
relationships in a normative Fourth Amendment analysis.
Intimacy and personal relationships have long been a central focus of privacy theory, and more recent developments in
surveillance theory have specifically examined the potential for
surveillance to disrupt relationships. Scholars have explored intimacy as an important component of privacy since the 1970s,121
developing various accounts of the values of private relationships and the perniciousness of judgmental or exploitative observation.122 Recently, contextual theories of privacy have explored
the disparate norms of information flow that govern various relationships.123 Surveillance can harm these associations not only

118. See id. at 287 (refusing to create a bright-line rule protecting emails
and noting that protecting emails is somewhat in tension with the reasoning of
Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
119. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (collecting cases).
120. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 68486 (1977)
(non-marital intimacy); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 50304
(1977) (plurality opinion) (cohabitation); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) (parent-child); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965)
(marriage); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 46062
(1958) (striking down, on due process grounds, a law likely to deter citizens from
associating with others for the purposes of advocacy).
121. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 108, at 142 (discussing intimacy as it relates
to love and friendship and the necessity of privacy for those relationships to
flourish); Gerety, supra note 54, at 268, 273 (compiling cases).
122. See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 57–58,
61–63 (1992) (exploring the connection between intimate information, access,
and decision making); Gerstein, supra note 111, at 267–69.
123. Nissenbaum, supra note 113, at 13839 (“Generally, these norms circumscribe the type or nature of information about various individuals that,
within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even demanded to be revealed.
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when these norms are violated and information is spread too
widely, but also when the fear of observation prevents the communication necessary to maintain these relationships.124 Intimacy, privacy, and communication are essential components of
personal relationships, and our understanding of the roles they
play has grown substantially in recent years.
c. Psychological and Physical Injury
The third factor asks whether people will suffer psychological or physical injury as a result of surveillance. The impact of
surveillance goes beyond the substantial effects it can have on
people’s activities and relationships. Even in the absence of such
effects, the targets of surveillance can suffer personal harm from
the observation, judgment, fear, and occasional use of physical
force associated with government investigations.125
Under this factor, evidence that a surveillance technique
will likely cause stress, depression, or physical harm would
weigh in favor of Fourth Amendment protection. The injuries
captured here include not only violations of privacy but also a
variety of other important harms, including discrimination, police coercion, and physical harm.126 In many cases, judges may
be able to reason about or intuit such harms. For instance, they
can conclude that constant visual monitoring of a subject will result in stress or that stop-and-frisk techniques will be associated
with aggressive physical force. There are, moreover, an increasing number of studies and reports that demonstrate measurable
psychological and physical harms from surveillance.127
The rich and growing social science literature on the personal harms of surveillance has been largely ignored in existing
Fourth Amendment scholarship. Yet it can provide a way for
judges to concretize and measure internal privacy harms in a
normative Fourth Amendment analysis. For example, studies of
computer keystroke monitoring, telephone monitoring, and related practices have found a variety of psychological harms suf-

In medical contexts, it is appropriate to share details of our physical condition . . . among friends we may pour over romantic entanglements . . . .”).
124. See id.
125. See infra notes 13945.
126. See infra Part III.C.
127. See infra notes 12833 and accompanying text.
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fered by the targets of surveillance, including stress, anger, fatigue, depression, irritation, and infantilization.128 Researchers
have also measured the physical and psychosomatic harms produced by surveillance, such as muscle pain and headaches.129
Studies of video monitoring show that subjects feel discomfort
and agitation, as well as a feeling of being mistrusted.130 Research into stop-and-frisks and related police investigations
demonstrate that a history of police contact is correlated with
higher anxiety and stress, while stop-and-frisk frequency and invasiveness is correlated with symptoms of PTSD.131 Studies of
civilians subjected to consent searches of their vehicles reported
persistent negative thoughts and attitudes about the encounter,
as well as feelings of violation and bitterness.132 These reports
can be augmented with the numerous studies in which respondents rate the perceived invasiveness of various surveillance practices including location tracking, social media monitoring, and

128. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Schleifer et al., Mood Disturbance and Musculoskeletal Discomfort Effects of Electronic Performance Monitoring in a VDT DataEntry Task, in ORGANIZATIONAL RISK FACTORS FOR JOB STRESS 195 (Steven L.
Sauter & Lawrence R. Murphy eds., 1995) (psychological and musculoskeletal
strain); Carl Botan & Mihaela Vorvoreanu, “What Are You Really Saying to
Me?” Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, CERIAS TECH REPORT, June
2000, at 9–10, http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Botan_2000.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J68P-ELEM] (distrust and lack of motivation); Irving, supra note 114,
at 799 (stress and “decrease in the quality of relationships with peers, supervisors, and senior management”); M. J. Smith et al., Employee Stress and Health
Complaints in Jobs with and Without Electronic Performance Monitoring, 23
APPLIED ERGONOMICS 17, 2122 (1992) (anxiety, depression, anger, health complaints, and fatigue).
129. E.g., Schleifer et al., supra note 128, at 195; Smith et al., supra note
128, at 2122.
130. Emmeline Taylor, I Spy with My Little Eye: The Use of CCTV in Schools
and the Impact on Privacy, 58 SOC. REV. 381, 39193 (2010); see also MCCAHILL,
supra note 93, at 15–16 (discussing the discriminatory harms that CCTV facilitates).
131. Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of
Young Urban Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321, 232324 (2014); Abigail A.
Sewell et al., Living Under Surveillance: Gender, Psychological Distress, and
Stop-Question-and-Frisk Policing in New York City, 159 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 2,
67 (2016).
132. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 21213 (2002). One respondent noted that
the police encounter produced “an empty feeling, like you’re nothing.” Id. at 212.
Another said, “I feel really violated . . . . I feel really bitter about the whole
thing.” Id.
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internet data collection.133 Together, these studies constitute a
detailed and wide-ranging account of the internal harms of surveillance.
This is not to say that every surveillance technique found to
cause stress or discomfort in a study should be considered a
search. Rather, these and similar studies can help to quantify
the harms of surveillance and are accordingly relevant to the
question of the Fourth Amendment’s scope. The fact that a surveillance technique is linked to stress or pain is just one factor of
several in the proposed normative test, and the relevant social
science will rarely be definitive in any event. Moreover, not every
surveillance situation confronted by courts will have been addressed in an existing study of surveillance’s concrete harms.
Yet, courts can usefully test their intuitions about the harms
caused by surveillance against the available evidence, taking
empirical data into account as they have in a wide variety of constitutional and other cases, including Brown v. Board of Education,134 Roper v. Simmons,135 and countless others.136 Courts can

133. Tamara Dinev et al., Internet Privacy Concerns and Beliefs About Government Surveillance—An Empirical Investigation, 17 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS.
214, 223 (2008); Yongick Jeong & Erin Coyle, What Are You Worrying About on
Facebook and Twitter? An Empirical Investigation of Young Social Network Site
Users’ Privacy Perceptions and Behaviors, 14 J. INTERACTIVE ADVERT. 51, 55
(2014); Laurel A. McNall & Jeffrey M. Stanton, Private Eyes Are Watching You:
Reactions to Location Sensing Technologies, 26 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 299, 304
(2011); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.
J. 213, 27576 (2002); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An
Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42
DUKE L.J. 727, 73739 tbl.1 (1993); Tokson, supra note 5, at 622–26.
134. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
135. 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
136. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–91 (2014) (discussing
phone usage statistics to demonstrate that searching a cell phone is different
and more invasive than other types of searches); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68–69 (2010) (discussing scientifically established psychological differences
between adults and minors); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 469–70 (1990)
(discussing studies and testimony regarding the effects of involuntary disclosure between parents and children in analyzing a law requiring teens to consult
with their parents before obtaining access to abortions); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50–52 (1986) (holding that the City was permitted to rely on studies performed by other cities to demonstrate the impact of
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also draw useful comparisons between known surveillance
harms and those likely to be suffered in analogous cases. Moreover, judges and juries already conduct a somewhat similar inquiry in personal injury cases, where they assess damages for
psychological pain and suffering.137
3. Less Invasive Means
Finally, the normative test incorporates a requirement that
courts consider whether there is a less invasive practice that
could reveal roughly the same information as the challenged
practice. If a surveillance technique is invasive or affects an entire population, and a less invasive, feasible alternative exists,
that would weigh in favor of finding a Fourth Amendment
search. If alternative techniques would not be as effective or
would be prohibitively costly, that would weigh against finding
a search.
Courts currently apply a similar, albeit stricter, standard in
cases involving the Wiretap Act, which directs the government
to show that it has attempted less invasive surveillance before
applying for a wiretap.138 In Fourth Amendment law, the Supreme Court has expressly considered the availability of less invasive means when assessing the constitutionality of conducting
blood tests on suspected drunk drivers.139 This factor is also

adult theaters on the community before enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance). Social science and other scientific research are also routinely analyzed
in administrative law cases. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 559–60 (2001) (explaining FDA studies of the effects of smokeless tobacco
and cigar use on teens).
137. Tokson, supra note 13, at 199; see Sean Hannon Williams, Self-Altering
Injury: The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 535,
543–44 n.42 (2011) (collecting cases involving hedonic damages). The inquiry
proposed here would likely be substantially easier, as the psychological harm
from surveillance need only be situated somewhere on the general scale from
low to high and would not have to be translated into a precise money value. Fact
finders tend to be far more consistent in performing the former calculation than
the latter. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2097103, 2099 tbl.1
(1998) (finding that mock jurors assessing various hypothetical cases tend to
give consistent rankings of blameworthiness but very different damages
awards).
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012); United States v. Carter, 449 F.3d
1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
139. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184, (2016) (holding that
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based in part on the intermediate scrutiny test in free speech
law, which directs courts to approve restrictions on certain types
of speech only if the restrictions do not burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to serve a significant government
interest.140 Similarly, the existence here of a potentially less restrictive alternative would not definitively render a surveillance
technique unlawful, but it would be a factor that favors applying
a warrant requirement.141
C. OMITTED FACTORS
The proposed test, like any Fourth Amendment test, cannot
incorporate every potential surveillance harm or every abstract
Fourth Amendment value without devolving into a “totality of
the circumstances” standard.142 Accordingly, the test does not
analyze every circumstance or examine every theory that might
bear on the normative assessment of a surveillance practice.
Conceptually, it emphasizes pragmatic and contextual theories
of surveillance rather than more abstract theories that center on
control over information, autonomy, or personality development.143 The latter theories operate at too high a level of abstraction to be useful in a legal test. The normative approach proposed
here focuses on the more concrete harms of surveillance in order
to remain workable for judges and capable of consistent application.

police officers cannot warrantlessly conduct blood tests incident to arrest because “[b]lood tests are significantly more intrusive [than breath tests], and
their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test”).
140. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
141. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(explaining that intermediate scrutiny requires only a reasonable fit between
means and ends and does not require that the government select the least restrictive means possible).
142. This is not to say that totality of the circumstances tests are entirely
foreign to Fourth Amendment law. See e.g., Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2189 (assessing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement using
a totality of the circumstances test).
143. E.g., Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 738
(1999) (“Privacy has value relative to normative conceptions of spiritual personality, political freedom, health and welfare, human dignity, and autonomy.”);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (defining privacy as “the
control we have over information about ourselves”).
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Yet the test’s focus on foregone activities and the psychological harms of surveillance can also capture many of the concerns
that drive the more abstract theories of privacy. Consider theories of privacy and autonomy, which focus on the need to preserve a private zone within which individuals can develop and
choose free of social coercion.144 Such coercion can cause the targets of surveillance to conform their behavior to perceived social
norms by foregoing legitimate but potentially embarrassing activities.145 And the social pressures inherent in many forms of
surveillance can result in psychological stress and harm.146
These foregone activities and psychological harms would be captured by the normative test. Likewise, the test’s consideration of
physical harms resulting from police investigatory activity is in
accord with theories of privacy that focus on bodily integrity and
personal dignity.147 These more abstract values are captured, at
least in part, by the proposed test, even though they are not
overtly included.
In any event, the impossibility of capturing every surveillance harm in a single test mirrors the impossibility of capturing
every facet of law enforcement benefit. Both the deterrence effects and the retributivist values served by law enforcement are
unlikely to be fully captured, for instance. Any workable balancing test will elide some quantum of harm and benefit on both
sides. One of the virtues of such tests is that they typically leave
out far less than other types of legal standards.148
The normative test also reflects a variety of the more abstract Fourth Amendment values identified by courts and scholars, such as privacy, liberty, or security.149 One advantage of a
pragmatic approach is that the practical harms of surveillance

144. See Cohen, supra note 56, at 1377, 1424.
145. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 181, 186 (2008); Richards, supra note 65, at 403–04.
146. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
147. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U.
L. REV. 359, 388 (2000).
148. See infra Part III.A.
149. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Privacy as the Central Value
Protected by the Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches, 48
TEX. TECH L. REV. 143, 157–62 (2015) (collecting studies identifying different
but closely related Fourth Amendment principles).
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are often common denominators among the various abstract theories of Fourth Amendment principles.150 Indeed, to the extent
that courts and historians have identified a single general purpose of the Fourth Amendment, that purpose is itself more functional than abstract: to protect citizens from arbitrary government intrusions.151 Given this shared practical foundation, it is
unsurprising that the various theories of Fourth Amendment
values overlap more than they conflict.152 The common functional goals of these various Fourth Amendment “search” theories are largely captured by the proposed test.153
II. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT BALANCING
In setting out the normative model, the previous Part discussed some of the legal and theoretical foundations of its factors. This Part briefly examines doctrinal, historical, and theoretical support for a normative balancing approach in general.
The Fourth Amendment’s text and its broader purposes are consistent with the balancing of law enforcement benefits against
the costs of surveillance.154 The language and history of the
Amendment evince a concern with effective law enforcement as
150. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth
Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2009) (discussing state intrusions on same-sex intimacy and noting the link between principles of liberty
and the protection of intimate relationships); Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1101–
07 (1998) (discussing state intrusions on private decisions surrounding relationships and arguing that the right of privacy is fundamentally a right of protection
of personal relationships).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)
(“[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the
United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.”); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against arbitrary intrusion by the police is part of the Due Process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Davies, supra note 67, at 556 (discussing
“the larger purpose for which the Framers adopted the text; namely to curb the
exercise of discretionary authority by officers”).
152. John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment,
2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 675 (2008); Slobogin, supra note 149, at 152–54.
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment also protects
against unreasonable “seizures,” a separate prohibition than the one addressed
here and one that embodies the values of protection of property and freedom
from arrest.
154. See infra Part II.A.

772

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:741

well as citizen privacy.155 Moreover, both the leading originalist
interpretation of the Amendment and less formalist theories of
construction point to a balancing approach.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S BALANCE
Balancing is inherent in Fourth Amendment law, as reflected in the Amendment’s history, language, and purposes. The
very concept of warrants supported by “probable cause”156 contemplates a balancing between law enforcement interests and
citizen privacy.157 The government can obtain a search warrant
only if it has sufficient cause to believe the search will uncover a
crime.158 Once the government has sufficient cause, it can search
citizens and their property despite the considerable harms to privacy and liberty that might result.159 Indeed, the police can enter
the house of a totally innocent person to arrest a criminal or seize
contraband possessed by a houseguest.160 Neither the interests
of individuals in avoiding government intrusions nor the interests of law enforcement are absolute.
Founding-era practices likewise evinced a non-absolutist approach to searches and seizures. Unlawful searches were addressed with civil liability rather than the exclusion of evidence.161 The trespass actions that provided a basis for Fourth
Amendment protection were themselves tempered by doctrines

155. See infra Part II.B.
156. See infra Part II.B.
157. See infra Part II.B.
158. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 24346 (1983).
159. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981) (noting that a warrant gives the police “a special authorization to thrust themselves into the privacy of a home” as well as the authority to physically detain occupants of the
home while it is searched for contraband).
160. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213, 222 (1981) (stating
that the police could enter the house of an innocent third party to arrest a felon
if they had a search warrant or probable cause and exigency).
161. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.).
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of necessity, which allowed trespasses when necessary to prevent public or private harm.162 Unwarranted invasions were generally excused if contraband was discovered.163 In each situation,
citizens’ protections against government intrusions were counterweighted by other values and defeasible in cases involving
probable cause, public or private necessity, or actual guilt.164
The balancing inherent in Fourth Amendment law does not
dictate that courts must balance when examining the scope of
the Amendment—perhaps balancing should be confined to other
aspects of Fourth Amendment law or eschewed altogether.165
But a normative balancing test for scope is consistent with the
structure and traditional practice of the Fourth Amendment.
B. TEXT, ORIGINALISM, AND DETERMINACY
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches,”
a phrase that is not defined and is susceptible to a wide variety
of meanings.166 The dominant view of the Fourth Amendment is
that its text and history are of little or no help in determining its
scope.167 Yet, a number of scholars contend that the scope of the
Amendment is determinable by reference to the original public
meaning of the relevant phrase.168
162. See, e.g., Campbell v. Race, 61 Mass. (7. Cush.) 408, 41011 (1851) (collecting American and English sources describing the common law rule that encroachment on private property was permitted when a highway becomes impassable); Mouse’s Case, [1608] 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.) 1342 (finding that
property may be trespassorily destroyed if necessary to save lives).
163. See, e.g., Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. 246, 310 (1818); Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 767 (1994) (collecting sources).
164. See supra notes 16063.
165. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
166. See Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 62730 (2018).
167. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 395; Orin S. Kerr, The Curious
History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70.
168. See, e.g., Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017 WL 3530961 [hereinafter Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief]; DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 251 (2017); Amar, supra note 163, at 767.
There are other forms of originalist interpretation, including “original methods
originalism,” which recommend interpreting the Constitution by reference to
the methods of legal interpretation used at the time of the Founding. See, e.g.,
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L.
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This Article does not undertake to resolve this debate, because it need not resolve it—both major views of the determinism of the Fourth Amendment’s text are consistent with the normative balancing approach. Indeed, both counsel weighing the
harms of surveillance against law enforcement justifications in
order to determine which investigations the police can perform
without any quantifiable suspicion.169 This Section explores theories regarding the determinacy of the Fourth Amendment and
shows how they provide further support for Fourth Amendment
balancing.
1. Fourth Amendment Searches as Textually Determinate
Several Fourth Amendment scholars have argued that the
term “search” in the context of the Fourth Amendment gives specific guidance as to the scope of the Amendment.170 They contend
that the Amendment applies to any “search” in the broadest
sense of that term, meaning any act of seeking, gathering information, or looking at something.171 Thus a government official
looking at a house or a crowd of people would be conducting a
warrantless Fourth Amendment search.172 Many such searches
would be lawful, however, because they would be “reasonable.”173
Reasonableness would no longer require a warrant supported by
probable cause as a default rule; instead, reasonableness would
be a more general inquiry into whether a search had a “good and
sufficient justification” and was not “greater than is fit” or “immoderate.”174 Although the reasonableness inquiry is an amorphous, “common sense” sort of analysis,175 it would consider how

REV. 751, 78687 (2009). The predominant originalist approach in the Fourth
Amendment context focuses on original public meaning, and that is the approach discussed in this section.
169. See infra Parts II.B.12.
170. See supra note 168.
171. Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 168, at 67; GRAY, supra
note 168, at 251; Amar, supra note 163, at 76869.
172. See, e.g., Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 168, at 13;
Amar, supra note 163, at 768.
173. Amar, supra note 163, at 769.
174. Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 168, at 14–15.
175. Amar, supra note 163, at 801.
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intrusive a search is,176 and whether the search is excessive in
light of its justifications.177
This interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is notably
consistent with the balancing approach proposed in Part I. Both
approaches would resolve the question of when the government
can engage in warrantless surveillance by making a normative
inquiry to determine whether such surveillance is justified.
There are differences, of course. This Article’s approach is more
specific and less reliant on distant historical analogy than the
originalist approaches.178 It would also conduct its balancing at
the “scope” stage rather than the “reasonableness” stage of a
Fourth Amendment case, preserving the longstanding role of
warrants and probable cause in regulating police behavior.179
The warrant requirement, unlike the Katz test, has not come under widespread attack by scholars or commentators.180 Indeed,
many have argued for strengthening the requirement by limiting its various exceptions, and empirical data indicates that warranted searches are far more likely than unwarranted probablecause searches to actually produce evidence of crime.181 The nor-

176. Id.
177. Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 168, at 15. Note that this
is not the only originalist interpretation of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Laura Donohue has argued that “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment’s
text refers to something “against the reason of the common law,” including warrantless entry into a home. See Laura Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2016). This approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness would be less consistent with the normative balancing
approach proposed above and would likely be more focused on government actions violating the common law.
178. Cf. Originalist Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 168, at 34 (analyzing
cell phone signal data collection by reference to the general warrant cases of the
pre-Founding era).
179. Under the Fourth Amendment, once a government action is found to be
a “search,” it can still be justified as “reasonable” if, for instance, the government has obtained a warrant or qualified for an exception to the warrant requirement. The prevailing originalist approach to reasonableness would simply
ask whether a search was generally reasonable, rather than requiring a warrant as a default. Id. at 15; Amar, supra note 163, at 801.
180. Cf. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 4445 (2007) (suggesting that
courts preserve ex ante review but advocating for the issuance of warrants on
less than probable cause).
181. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 481 (1991); Wayne D.
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mative test would avoid overturning more than a century of warrant-requirement precedents and undermining effective ex ante
judicial review of police surveillance.182 But the inquiry would be
conceptually similar to the originalist inquiry. Moreover, it
would make little difference to a police officer whether looking
at a house without probable cause is lawful because it is not regulated by the Fourth Amendment or because it is “reasonable.”183 The normative test proposed here is congruous with the
predominant originalist interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.184
2. Fourth Amendment Searches as Textually Indeterminate
The majority of scholars who have written on the Fourth
Amendment’s scope consider its text and history to be indeterminate, or at best, profoundly underdeterminate.185 Not only is

Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 532
(1997); Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 913, 92325 (2009).
182. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014); Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 33839 (2000); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 170 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 7
(1918); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 616 (1886).
183. See Amar, supra note 163, at 769.
184. Indeed, to the extent that originalism incorporates values of stare decisis, the normative test may be the optimal originalist approach because it avoids
overturning longstanding precedents. See supra note 182.
185. See supra note 167. For a discussion of underdeterminacy and construction in legal interpretation, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 458 (2013). Some originalist
scholars have argued that underdeterminate text can be clarified by reference
to the spirit of the constitutional provision at issue, i.e. its original function or
purpose. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A
Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2018). In this context, the
generally acknowledged purposes of the Fourth Amendment are fairly abstract
and may not substantially clarify the scope of the Fourth Amendment. See Tokson, supra note 166, at 635 & n.279 (noting that historians generally consider
the “bedrock purpose of the Fourth Amendment” to be the protection of “privacy,
property, and liberty from undue intrusions by government officers,” and quoting several historians). Assuming historians are correct that a core purpose of
the Amendment was to protect values like privacy and liberty against government oppression, the test proposed here is likely congruent with an originalpurpose-based approach.
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the term “search” ambiguous and capable of multiple meanings,186 but the Supreme Court’s time-honored interpretation of
“reasonable” as typically requiring a warrant or at least some
articulable suspicion means that not every investigative act can
be a search.187 The crucial question of when the police can conduct suspicion-less surveillance is not answered in the text or
history.188
What should courts do when addressing an indeterminate
law? General theories of legal indeterminacy typically conceive
of judges who fill legal gaps as acting in a legislative capacity
and attempting to reach optimal outcomes via a normative-style
inquiry.189 This inquiry might entail the consideration of moral
values, policy judgments, or personal experiences.190 Judges
might accordingly weigh these types of considerations in addressing the Fourth Amendment’s scope in the absence of formal
guidance. These broad prescriptions do not mandate a balancing
test, but they are certainly consistent with the use of normative
balancing when addressing indeterminate law.
Further, theories of indeterminacy that focus on how courts
should formulate legal tests in the absence of determinate law
directly support the use of a balancing test in the Fourth Amendment context.191 The issue of the Fourth Amendment’s scope is
normatively complex, covers a wide variety of government conduct, and has been repeatedly destabilized by technological and
social change.192 Non-balancing standards may therefore fail to
186. Kerr, supra note 167, at 70.
187. Tokson, supra note 166, at 640.
188. Id. at 628–29.
189. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 197–99 (1979); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
43 (1985). Ronald Dworkin takes a philosophically different approach to doctrinal indeterminacy that ultimately offers similar advice. See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 124, 128 (1977) (describing the central role of political and personal convictions in Dworkinian adjudication). Dworkin argues that
judges should address difficult legal questions by choosing the outcome that fits
best with the overarching narrative or theory of law and with political morality.
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 138–43 (1985); DWORKIN, supra, at
107.
190. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 148
(1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 82–83, 106–08 (2008); DAVID
A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (2010).
191. See supra note 80.
192. Tokson, supra note 166, at 614–15, 643–44.
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capture the fundamental values underlying the issue and may
not be much simpler to apply than a direct balancing test.193
Moreover, courts are increasingly likely to be able to obtain the
information they need to effectively balance in the Fourth
Amendment context.194 In such a situation, a balancing test is
likely to be the optimal approach for courts faced with legal indeterminacy.195 General theories of legal indeterminacy are consistent with a normative balancing approach, and more detailed
theories directly support such an approach.
III. THE CASE FOR A NORMATIVE BALANCING MODEL
The previous Parts have set out a normative balancing
model for the Fourth Amendment’s scope, traced the lineage of
its various factors, and given an account of its doctrinal, historical, and theoretical foundations. This Part details the normative
balancing model’s more practical advantages: directness, adaptability to social and technological change, inclusion of non-privacy harms, harmonization of doctrine with practice, and applicability to broad surveillance programs. In a society where
surveillance technology consistently advances and expectations
of privacy continually shrink, these benefits may be indispensable.196
A. DIRECTNESS
A prominent advantage of the normative balancing approach is that it directly addresses the normative values at issue.
Courts need not use “false targets” or proxies that stand in for
essential Fourth Amendment interests;197 they would examine
those interests directly. If judges can administer a balancing test
193. Cloud, supra note 6, at 28–36; Tokson, supra note 166, at 644–45.
194. Tokson, supra note 166, at 645. See generally John R. Aiello & Kathryn
J. Kolb, Electronic Performance Monitoring and Social Context: Impact on
Productivity and Stress, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 339, 339 (1995) (studying
stress among the targets of surveillance); Christopher Slobogin, Government
Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 (2008)
(setting out the average perceived intrusiveness of various types of searches);
Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 773–77 (2018) (discussing how courts might
quantify damages from privacy breaches).
195. Tokson, supra note 166, at 613–16.
196. See id. at 614.
197. See id. at 60911.
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effectively, then its outcomes should maximize societal welfare
relative to other tests.
Of course, the other side of this coin is that balancing tests
are generally difficult to administer, as discussed below.198 But
a balancing approach is likely to be more effective than a narrower standard in this context. Because the question of the
Fourth Amendment’s scope is conceptually complex, broad, and
subject to constant disruption by new technologies, it is unlikely
that a narrow standard can effectively capture the fundamental
values at stake.199 A balancing test, though hardly without drawbacks, avoids this fatal error.
Relatedly, the normative approach embodies the balance
that is inherent in the Fourth Amendment.200 It squarely addresses the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, directly assessing the harms of arbitrary government intrusions and the
practical values of security, liberty, and privacy.201 It hews far
more closely to traditional Fourth Amendment goals than does,
for instance, the Katz test, which focuses on current societal expectations about privacy.202
B. ADAPTABILITY TO SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The normative approach is especially adaptable to new circumstances and new surveillance technologies. It looks to law
enforcement benefits and practical privacy harms, no matter
how those benefits and harms may manifest in a given surveillance context. Alternative tests are often more rigid and prone
to destabilization by changing circumstances.203
Changes in surveillance practices and technologies have repeatedly undermined narrower Fourth Amendment tests in the
past. In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment’s protections were limited to the
specific types of property enumerated in the “persons, houses,
papers, and effects” clause of the Amendment.204 This propertybased approach exposed telephone and other conversations to
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See infra Part IV.A.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 66.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Tokson, supra note 13, at 18187.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928).
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pervasive government monitoring, leading to egregious privacy
violations and political abuses.205 The Court eventually adopted
the Katz test, which expanded the Fourth Amendment’s coverage to intangible things and based it on expectations of privacy.206 Yet the Katz test has itself been rapidly destabilized as
threats to privacy proliferate, knowledge of such threats gradually spreads, and the cost-per-citizen of surveillance drops precipitously.207 In a society where the government can collect huge
databases of personal information held by commercial third parties,208 engage in constant visual monitoring via drones or satellites,209 or mine email metadata to reveal intimate details about
people’s lives,210 the concept of an expectation of privacy not
grounded in legal protections is increasingly obsolete.
Adaptability is especially important given the outsized role
that social and technological change plays in Fourth Amendment
law. A normative balancing approach allows courts to take account of a novel surveillance context without depending on societal expectations or waiting for Congress to pass a law—a wait
that might take decades.211 The normative test is resilient to the
changes that have undermined previous and current Fourth
Amendment tests.
C. DISCRIMINATION-BASED HARMS
Many of the harms of surveillance are related to the loss of
privacy that occurs when a subject is observed by others. But the
205. See, e.g., U.S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-755,
at 18384, 198201 (1976) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM.].
206. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
207. See Tokson, supra note 13, at 18187.
208. E.g., Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helper: How ChoicePoint
and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law
Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 595, 63537 (2004).
209. Robert Draper, They Are Watching You—And Everything Else on the
Planet, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 2018, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/
magazine/2018/02/surveillance-watching-you [https://perma.cc/769W-LDCP].
210. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books
-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.
211. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) has not yet been
meaningfully updated since it became law in 1986, despite massive advances
and changes in email technology. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2703 (2012).
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Katz test’s exclusive focus on informational privacy fails to capture some of the most harmful aspects of government surveillance: discrimination, coercion, intimidation, and physical
harm.212 Routine police encounters on public sidewalks or roads,
for instance, may have little impact on informational privacy but
nonetheless may harm individuals through coercion or the
threat of violence.213 The normative test takes a broader view of
Fourth Amendment privacy and protection, one that considers
the personal harms of surveillance whether they arise from observation or from more direct tactics of intimidation or coercion.214
Non-privacy harms may be especially important when surveillance reflects discrimination against certain groups or otherwise expresses societal condemnation of surveillance targets.
State surveillance can have a powerful expressive component,
conveying the message that its targets are low-status members
of society, unworthy of trust, or inherently dangerous.215 Discrimination itself, including discrimination associated with police practices, can cause serious short-term psychological and
physical effects, including stress, depression, elevated heart
rate, and high blood pressure.216 Over the long term, such discrimination is correlated with a variety of health problems, such
as heart attacks and strokes.217 Surveillance programs that target or disproportionately affect a particular demographic group
may cause serious harms to individuals that should be taken into
account in a Fourth Amendment analysis. The normative test
allows courts to directly consider such harms when assessing a
government surveillance practice.

212. See Stuntz, supra note 9, at 1065–66.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
215. See Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102
IOWA L. REV. 1533, 156367 (2017).
216. Pamela J. Sawyer et al., Discrimination and the Stress Response: Psychological and Physiological Consequences of Anticipating Prejudice in Interethnic Interactions, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1020, 1022 tbl.1 (2012); Abigail A.
Sewell & Kevin A. Jefferson, Collateral Damage: The Health Effects of Invasive
Police Encounters in New York City, 93 J. URB. HEALTH 542, 543 (2016).
217. Sawyer et al., supra note 216, at 1020.
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D. HARMONIZING PRACTICE AND DOCTRINE
The Katz test directs courts to assess society’s expectations
of privacy, and many courts faithfully attempt to do so. Lower
courts especially tend to address novel Fourth Amendment scope
questions by attempting to calculate societal knowledge and expectations about surveillance practices.218 The Supreme Court
frequently does the same, looking explicitly to our “everyday expectations of privacy”219 and what people “typically know”220 in
determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment.221 The results
and reasoning of such cases are frequently criticized, but one
might at least admire these courts’ fidelity to governing precedent.222
Yet many Fourth Amendment cases, especially at the Supreme Court level, appear to be driven by normative concerns
rather than doctrinal ones.223 Consider the third-party doctrine,
which states that people waive their Fourth Amendment rights
in things that they voluntarily disclose to a third party.224 This
infamous doctrine threatens privacy in a vast swath of personal
data in the internet age.225 Yet, even before it was expressly limited in Carpenter v. United States,226 the third-party doctrine
218. See Tokson, supra note 13, at 154, 15658, 16163 (describing numerous examples of lower courts attempting to assess the extent of societal
knowledge in order to determine societal expectations of privacy).
219. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
220. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
221. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 33839 (2000) (“[A] bus
passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that
other passengers or bus employees will . . . feel the bag in an exploratory manner.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (“It is common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of the road are readily accessible
to . . . scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (“The public is fully aware that it is accorded less
privacy in its automobiles . . . .”).
222. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 180, at 15164 (2007); Lewis R. Katz, In
Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549,
564–66 (1990).
223. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Kerr, supra note 32, at 519.
224. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
44243 (1976).
225. Tokson, supra note 5, at 585.
226. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (holding that bank records are not protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are exposed to bank employees
in the ordinary course of business).
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seemed to disappear whenever it would produce a particularly
unjust outcome.227 In a typical third-party doctrine case, exposure of something to a third party’s employees eliminates Fourth
Amendment protection in that thing.228 Yet in Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, the Court held that a state hospital’s program of
surreptitiously testing patients’ urine for cocaine violated the
Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that patients voluntarily
turned over their urine to hospital employees.229 And the Court
held in Stoner v. California that the police must obtain a search
warrant to enter a hotel room despite the fact that “maids, janitors, or repairmen” routinely enter and observe the room in the
normal course of business.230 Recently, in Carpenter, several dissenting Justices reasonably complained that the Court’s decision
to extend the Fourth Amendment to cell phone location data appeared driven by normative considerations rather than the literal Katz test.231 Policy considerations, rather than societal expectations, seem to dictate the outcomes of several other Fourth
Amendment cases as well.232 Indeed, they appear to drive the
outcomes of some cases that purport to turn on neutral concepts
like trespass and property.233

227. Neil Richards notes a similar phenomenon in Richards, supra note 40,
at 146873, contending that the Supreme Court was always more concerned
with the unrevealing nature of the information at issue in the third-party doctrine cases than with the fact of disclosure to third parties.
228. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
229. 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001). The Court granted certiorari only on the issue of whether the testing fit within the special needs exception and assumed a
lack of patient consent. Id. at 76. But the dissenting Justices noted that the
patients’ consent was obvious and provided a clear basis to resolve the case. Id.
at 9296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
231. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2236 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
232. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (holding that dog sniffs
for contraband are not searches regardless of people’s expectations of privacy);
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (holding that testing substances for contraband is not a search); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536
(1984) (expressly considering the benefits and costs of permitting warrantless
searches of prison cells); Kerr, supra note 32, at 51922.
233. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013) (finding a Fourth
Amendment search under the Jones trespass test despite the absence of a trespass, based largely on novel claims about the social norms that govern approaching a doorstep).
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The normative test directs courts to give an account of the
core normative considerations that appear to drive a substantial
portion of the Supreme Court’s cases. It would have the benefit
of making the Court’s actual rationales for its decisions visible
and subject to scrutiny. When the Supreme Court reaches an essentially normative decision but obscures its reasoning behind
one Katz doctrine or another, observers are less able to predict
future cases, detect judicial bias, or understand existing law. The
normative test would better align the outcomes of Fourth
Amendment cases with their actual rationales, promoting transparency and judicial credibility.
E. AGGREGATION AND SPILLOVER
The normative test would help courts to address the Fourth
Amendment issues raised by aggregated programs of surveillance. Wide-ranging surveillance programs can yield massive
databases of citizens’ information.234 These vast collections of
data can be analyzed to reveal far more than would be revealed
by any single act of investigation.235 Aggregated surveillance
programs are increasingly problematic as the cost-per-citizen of
surveillance and analysis decreases.236
Current Fourth Amendment approaches are largely blind to
the dangers of aggregate surveillance. Courts have rightly been
criticized for their transactional, non-systematic approach to
Fourth Amendment questions.237 Although courts occasionally
look to the future impacts of their decisions, they generally assess each investigatory act in isolation rather than considering
surveillance programs as a whole.238 This is problematic because, in practice, Fourth Amendment decisions that permit the
government to surveil one specific individual effectively grant
the government the power to surveil citizens en masse.

234. Renan, supra note 74, at 105860.
235. Id. at 1056.
236. See Tokson, supra note 32.
237. Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 298 (2016); Renan,
supra note 74, at 1053.
238. Renan, supra note 74, at 1053. At times, Fourth Amendment analyses
are overtly narrow, for example, looking to the specific terms of a particular
defendant’s privacy policy. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th
Cir. 2010).
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In several situations, the government has done just that.
The Supreme Court’s holding that the government may collect
Michael Lee Smith’s dialed telephone numbers provided the legal basis for surveillance programs targeting millions of citizens.
These include the NSA’s collection of citizens’ dialed phone numbers and the DEA’s decades-long program of collecting telephone
metadata on all calls from the United States to other countries.239 Likewise, the Court’s ruling that address information on
a postal letter is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment eventually became the basis for a government program of scanning
every mailed envelope into a massive database of postal communications.240 These aggregate programs of surveillance have a capacity to infringe on citizens’ privacy that is greater than the
sum of their parts, and they raise questions that the Court does
not even contemplate under traditional Fourth Amendment
tests.241
The normative test is better suited for addressing widespread surveillance and the collection of large databases of citizens’ personal information. It directs courts to assess surveillance at a programmatic level under the presumption that the
government will pursue unregulated surveillance as broadly as
resource constraints allow, as it has repeatedly done in the modern era.242 Thus it has the benefit of aligning courts’ assessments
with the likely consequences of their decisions.
A related problem in Fourth Amendment law is that of spillover, meaning that information collected for one purpose may
later be used for another, more invasive or problematic purpose.243 For instance, section 702 of FISA authorizes intelligence
agencies to monitor the phone calls and electronic communications of non-U.S. persons.244 The intelligence program, however,
239. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); see Renan, supra note
74, at 1055.
240. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Ron Nixon, Report Reveals
Wider Tracking of Mail in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes
.com/2014/10/28/us/us-secretly-monitoring-mail-of-thousands.html.
241. See Renan, supra note 74, at 1056.
242. See supra notes 239–40; see also Renan, supra note 74, at 1059 (discussing uses of license plate scanning to monitor people’s movements).
243. See Renan, supra note 74, at 106067.
244. See, e.g., Erin Kelly, What Is the Section 702 Surveillance Program and
Why Should You Care?, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2018/01/11/what-section-702-surveillance-program-and
-why-should-you-care/1025582001 [https://perma.cc/5U3H-ZCN2].
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also collects the data and communications of U.S. citizens communicating with non-U.S. citizens.245 This information is then
accessible by the FBI for domestic law enforcement purposes,
and the FBI uses it “[w]ith some frequency” for purely domestic
law enforcement.246 Similar problems arise with data collected
by private parties that is then purchased or obtained by the government for more invasive or de-anonymized uses.247
Although secondary uses of information are difficult to regulate under any standard, the normative test is more compatible
with judicial scrutiny of, say, transfers of data between different
government agencies or between private data brokers and government officials.248 While Katz’s expectations-of-privacy analysis is largely incompatible with the concept of regulating law enforcement collection of already-gathered information,249 the
normative approach could allow courts to determine that a
transfer of information to law enforcement entities is regulated
by the Fourth Amendment based on its substantial potential for
additional surveillance harms.250
IV. OBJECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Any test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope will have drawbacks as well as advantages. Normative balancing’s advantages
are arguably essential to an effective Fourth Amendment test.
Yet objections might be raised that counsel against adopting normative balancing nonetheless. This Part responds to some potential objections to a Fourth Amendment balancing test. In the
course of doing so, it touches on the deficiencies of the current
test, which carries many of the same drawbacks as the normative test with virtually none of the benefits. This Part also discusses two potential alternatives to the Katz test: the positive

245. Id.
246. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 59 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702
-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S687-SBWH].
247. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 74, at 106263.
248. See generally Ric Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C. L.
REV. 133 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of creating effective use restrictions
on government agencies).
249. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1984).
250. See generally supra Part I.B.2 (discussing harms to individuals).
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law approach and an Olmstead-like, textualist approach. In doing so, it develops another argument for the normative test—
even accounting for its disadvantages, the normative test is superior to the alternatives.
A. ADMINISTRABILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
One potential objection to the normative balancing test concerns its administrability. Multifactor balancing standards tend
to be more complex and have higher decision costs than other
potential tests.251 Relatedly, courts may lack the institutional capacity to effectively apply a balancing test. The normative approach asks judges to consider the likely effects of legal regulation on police and citizen behavior, a policy inquiry that may be
better suited to a legislature.252 Although balancing is a fundamental practice of courts, and the central metaphor of judging
involves balance scales, judges may be more effective applying
narrower standards or bright-line rules.253
The normative test is designed to mitigate some of the administrability issues and decision costs inherent in balancing
tests. It focuses on actual practices and communications as well
as measurable internal harms rather than abstract concepts of
privacy or security. It is also designed to allow judges to consult
intuitions about the potential effects of surveillance on their own
behaviors.254 Thus it is likely to be more administrable than
many balancing tests commonly used in other areas of law.255
Further, balancing tests in general are well suited to “rulifica-

251. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 572–86 (1992). Concerns about decision costs may be mitigated
somewhat by the fact that stare decisis will resolve the vast majority of Fourth
Amendment decisions under any standard. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note
34, at 115358.
252. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857–87
(2004).
253. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987).
254. See, e.g., supra note 95 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (weighing
the interests of states against the burdens placed on interstate commerce); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (weighing a government employee’s interest in free speech against the interests of the government in efficiently providing public services).
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tion,” or the gradual development of sub-rules that govern particular situations.256 Rulification is likely to reduce decision costs
and increase administrability over time.257
More broadly, courts appear able to effectively apply balancing tests that consider the effects of legal regulation in a wide
variety of contexts. First Amendment law is famously a domain
of balancing tests, which allow courts to robustly protect free
speech without unduly hampering legitimate government activities.258 Similar balancing tests are also employed in the law of
equal protection,259 procedural due process,260 the Fifth Amendment,261 the dormant Commerce Clause,262 torts,263 and confidentiality.264 Although a definitive analysis of balancing in these
areas would require thousands of pages, the ubiquity of balancing tests suggests that courts are hardly incapable of applying
them.
Finally, although administrability is a concern with any balancing test, such a test could hardly be less administrable than
Katz.265 Although Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test
is confusing enough on its face, the test in practice is even more
complex and puzzling. Frustrated by the failures of the Katz test
to embody important Fourth Amendment principles, courts have
expanded and modified the test haphazardly.266 As Orin Kerr famously described, courts have created multiple, conflicting versions of the test, sometimes applying it literally, sometimes looking to positive law for guidance, sometimes emphasizing the

256. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of
Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 805–06 (2005).
257. See Tokson, supra note 166, at 652.
258. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 (2009).
259. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
260. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326 (1976).
261. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 65657 (1984).
262. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
263. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
264. See Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S.
Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 239 (2002).
265. See, e.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1825, 1860 (noting Katz’s notorious lack of administrability); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Etzioni, supra note 6, at 420–21; Solove, supra
note 8, at 1511.
266. See Tokson, supra note 166, at 64748.
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thing being investigated, and sometimes focusing mostly on policy considerations.267 Lower courts applying Katz in cases of first
impression must choose between these various conflicting models, yet there is no law or norm that tells them how to make this
crucial decision.268 Unsurprisingly, in novel cases, Fourth
Amendment law under the Katz test is unpredictable and chaotic.269 By contrast, the normative test directs a court to overtly
weigh the normative considerations at issue and to explain its
actual reasons for reaching its conclusions. Not only is this a
more rigorous approach, it is a more honest one, and it can help
facilitate the development of efficient sub-rules over time.270
B. UNPREDICTABILITY
A potential objection to normative approaches in general is
that they may be unpredictable and inconsistent across cases.
Different judges may reach conflicting normative conclusions or
may frame policy questions differently, leading to splits among
lower courts.271 Police officers using new surveillance techniques
or facing novel situations may have difficulty determining
whether they can lawfully surveil without a warrant.272 Ideally,
a Fourth Amendment test would be predictable and simple
enough for courts and police officers alike.273
There are several reasons to think that unpredictability is
not as significant a problem as it may seem, however. First,
while police officers can simply follow established law in most
cases, they are unlikely to be able to resolve difficult Fourth
Amendment questions of first impression under any viable test,
267. Kerr, supra note 223, at 507–08.
268. Although Orin Kerr has argued that certain patterns might help guide
lower court behavior, courts appear unaware of these patterns and any such
guidelines as to model selection appear to be faint and inconsistent. See Lior
Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Should Fourth Amendment Law Pay Attention
to What People Expect? If So, How?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2017/11/should-fourth-amendment
-pay-attention-to-what-people-expect-if-so-how.html [https://perma.cc/EYM7
-EZTN].
269. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring); Solove, supra note 8,
at 1519–20; Strahilevitz & Tokson, supra note 268.
270. Tokson, supra note 166, at 619.
271. Kerr, supra note 223, at 53637.
272. Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 403–04; Ohm, supra note 14, at 1333–34.
273. Wayne R. LaFave, ‘Case-by-Case Adjudication’ Versus ‘Standardized
Procedures’: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141–42 (1974).
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normative or otherwise. The Fourth Amendment’s remedial doctrines already take ample consideration of this difficulty. Qualified immunity limits officers’ liability to those cases where officers violate clearly established law,274 and the good faith doctrine
prevents the exclusion of evidence where officers rely on law that
is later overturned.275 Even if these doctrines were to disappear,
the indemnification of police officers would prevent officers from
facing personal consequences for non-egregious legal violations.276 Moreover, tests that are simple enough to permit police
officers to reliably answer novel Fourth Amendment questions
may be profoundly deficient in other respects, such as drastically
under-protecting privacy or protecting it in an extremely arbitrary manner.277
Second, under any Fourth Amendment test, a large majority
of cases will be governed by precedent and stare decisis. The Supreme Court has already resolved how the Fourth Amendment
applies in a wide variety of familiar surveillance contexts, including houses, cars, investigatory stops, inventory searches,
searches incident to arrest, border stops, and many forms of electronic surveillance.278 These precedents should continue to guide
courts and police officers under a normative test, even as courts
discard the Katz test which provided the nominal basis for many
of their outcomes. The values of stare decisis counsel preserving
the results of these cases, upon which law enforcement officials
have long relied.279 In addition, normative considerations often
drove the results of these cases far more than Katz’s ambiguous
“expectation of privacy” inquiry.280 A few existing cases should
be overturned under the new test, but stare decisis suggests
overturning only cases that are especially flawed.281

274. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
275. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353–54 (1987).
276. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 936
(2014).
277. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment is limited to physical trespasses against tangible
things).
278. See Allen & Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 115358.
279. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
280. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 66263 (1979).
281. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); See infra Part V.C.
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Finally, the normative test would perform no worse than the
current test in terms of predictability and consistency. For the
reasons discussed above,282 it is very difficult to predict how any
case of first impression will be resolved under Katz.283 Lower
courts facing novel Fourth Amendment questions frequently
produce splits284 or rule unanimously only to see their rulings
rejected by the Supreme Court.285 A normative test grounded in
the analysis of actual surveillance harm and law enforcement
benefit, aided by studies of the measurable effects of surveillance, would, if anything, be more consistent than the multimodel Katz regime.
C. REDUNDANCY
Another potential argument against a balancing test for the
Fourth Amendment’s scope is that it would be redundant in
some cases because the Court sometimes uses a balancing approach in determining whether a Fourth Amendment search or
seizure is “reasonable.”286 A test that balances to determine
whether something is a Fourth Amendment search and then
sometimes balances to determine whether that search is reasonable would be partially redundant and could impose high decision costs on courts.
Yet courts applying a balancing test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope would not have to balance again at the reasonableness stage, even in the subset of cases that use a reasonableness
balancing test. First, although courts in Fourth Amendment
cases often weigh the policy implications of their rulings, overt
balancing tests are relatively rare in Fourth Amendment law,
especially in cases regulating law enforcement.287 Courts tend to
282. See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.
284. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and
the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1195–1203 (2012) (listing nearly
forty unresolved circuit splits on Fourth Amendment issues).
285. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (rejecting
the unanimous holding of several federal courts of appeal that cell phone location information is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
286. Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of
Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT.
REV. 205, 237 (2015).
287. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (noting
that “search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing” and that the Court has “recognized only limited
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balance in “special needs” cases that are likely to involve “minimal” privacy interests and government interests other than the
traditional investigation of crime.288 To date, special needs cases
virtually always involve seizures or very clear searches such as
building inspections.289 The only issue is their reasonableness;
the Fourth Amendment’s application to the situation is obvious.
It might be objected that reasonableness balancing is not
limited to special needs cases, even if those cases are the only
ones that regularly employ balancing tests.290 Courts occasionally weigh competing considerations when addressing novel
questions of reasonableness.291 But such cases almost always involve obvious seizures, such as car stops and Terry stops, and
thus do not address the test for Fourth Amendment searches in
any event.292 In addition, these cases are rare; the default rule
for searches still requires a valid warrant,293 and the vast majority of cases that depart from that rule simply apply a suspicioncircumstances in which the usual rule does not apply”); Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (“To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search
ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”). See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (holding that a police
search of the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest was unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment and therefore required a warrant); California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991) (holding that the police can search a container
in an automobile without a warrant only if they have probable cause).
288. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (“In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion
would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.”); see also, e.g.,
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (stating that
balancing is appropriate “where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement”).
289. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990);
Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 53031 (1967).
290. Excessive force claims are generally evaluated under a totality of the
circumstances test that may incorporate balancing. See Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). These cases inherently involve seizures, thus a normative
balancing test for searches is unnecessary.
291. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1012 (collecting cases); Sam Kamin & Justin
Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 589, 602–03 (2014) (discussing the “increasingly freewheeling form of reasonableness balancing” in the context of investigative stops).
292. For additional examples, see Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704–
05 (1981).
293. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
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based standard, such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion.294
What if a case were to someday arise that presented both a
difficult “search” question and a special needs issue or novel reasonableness question that might require the court to weigh policy interests while fashioning a new rule? Even then, the normative balancing test proposed above would displace or at least
strongly inform any balancing performed at the reasonableness
stage. If a surveillance technique caused concrete harms that
outweighed its law enforcement benefits such that it required
Fourth Amendment regulation, then both that fact and the extent of the harms and benefits would inform the Court’s reasonableness inquiry. Most likely, no additional balancing would be
required. Even in the rarest hypothetical case, it is unlikely that
redundant balancing would be an issue.
D. BALANCING AND BIAS
Finally, a potential objection to a balancing test for the
Fourth Amendment’s scope is that such a test will be biased in
favor of the government. Several scholars have noted that courts
applying overt balancing tests to determine the reasonableness
of a seizure or search often favor the government.295 One might
extrapolate that balancing inherently favors the government in
the Fourth Amendment context.296
Although the government often prevails in cases where the
court departs from the default warrant requirement and engages
in balancing, it is unlikely that the balancing is to blame. Courts
typically engage in reasonableness balancing after identifying a
case as unique—as a “special needs” case rather than a normal

294. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (noting
that “search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing” and that the Court has “recognized only limited
circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply”).
295. Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J.
1, 1 (2013); Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 254, 296–97 (2011).
296. Richard Re, Fourth Amendment Fairness, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1409, 1419
(2018); Sundby, supra note 6, at 1765.
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one.297 Special needs cases are generally outside the realm of traditional law enforcement, involving non-criminal administrative
enforcement,298 children in school,299 non-criminal drug testing,300 and similar scenarios.301 The paradigm special needs case
involves “privacy interests that are minimal” and “important
governmental interests.”302 By classifying a case as special
needs, the court has largely already determined that its intrusions are minimal and the government’s needs unique, even before reasonableness is assessed.303 It is little wonder that the balancing in such cases is usually resolved in the government’s
favor.
There is, in other words, a strong selection effect at work
here. Courts overtly balance only in those cases where they feel
that a default warrant requirement is inappropriate.304 And yet,
even in this unique subset of cases, courts do not universally favor the government. For instance, the Supreme Court has ruled
against the government in cases where the justifications for a
drug testing program failed to outweigh its privacy intrusions,305
where a blood test incident to arrest was too invasive,306 and
where the sanctity of the home outweighed the government’s interest in drunk driving enforcement.307
In addition, overt balancing at the reasonableness stage
may favor the government in some cases because of the Court’s
lax and poorly defined reasonableness-balancing approach. It
sometimes focuses on government interests writ large and compares them to the one-off harms imposed on the single defendant
297. Fabio Arcila Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless
Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1227–31
(2004).
298. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 53031 (1967).
299. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 33839 (1985).
300. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 66566 (1989).
301. See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 65657
(1995).
302. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
303. See id.
304. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
305. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997) (striking down a statute
mandating drug testing of candidates for certain state officers).
306. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184–85 (2016); see also
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (ruling in favor of the defendant in a
reasonableness balancing case despite the presence of a warrant).
307. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750–53 (1984).
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challenging the seizure or search.308 This can create a sort of “imbalancing” test that favors the government by aggregating government interests while failing to do the same for citizens.309 But
the far more concrete test developed above specifically directs
courts to assess harms to citizens in the aggregate.310 The surveillance technique at issue is hypothesized to be widespread
and its targets numerous, as frequently happens when surveillance goes unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.311 A more
symmetrical balance should produce more symmetrical results.
E. POSITIVE LAW ALTERNATIVES
One model that courts have used when applying Katz looks
to positive law to determine when people have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In recent years, some scholars have suggested that courts should apply this model exclusively, basing
the scope of the Fourth Amendment on what other sources of law
permit or prohibit.312 The leading positive law proposal envisions
a test in which the Fourth Amendment applies whenever a government officer’s investigative action would be a violation of law,
a tort, or a use of the government’s unique legal authority.313 Although the positive law test offers some advantages, it has several flaws that render it undesirable as a determinant of the
Fourth Amendment’s scope.
A positive law approach would be more predictable than
most other approaches, at least in the subset of cases where positive law is clear. For instance, if a town had an ordinance prohibiting anyone but the licensed trash collecting company from
collecting people’s trash, then the police would not be able to examine trash in that town without a warrant.314 There will be numerous other cases, however, when government surveillance
presents an issue that is unresolved in existing statutes or precedents. Many government surveillance practices, like the use of

308. See Baradaran, supra note 295, at 1521.
309. Id.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 8789.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 23940.
312. See Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 183132; Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine, 107 KY. L.J. 169
(2018).
313. See Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 183132.
314. Id. at 1882.
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drug-sniffing dogs, arise rarely, if ever, in litigation between private parties.315 Even those that do arise in litigation commonly
rest on open-ended standards like “reasonableness,” which are
often less developed in the context of privacy torts than they are
in Fourth Amendment law.316 In a variety of cases, a positive law
test may simply move from a hard Fourth Amendment question
to an even harder tort question.317
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the positive law approach
is the arbitrariness of its protections. The Fourth Amendment
would often rest on considerations that have nothing to do with
citizens’ privacy, security, or freedom from government intrusion.318 Consider the trash collection example. A person’s trash,
which can reveal intimate details about activities inside their
home, would be protected in a town where laws establish a local
trash-collection monopoly and entirely unprotected in a town
without a monopoly.319 The protection of citizens’ privacy at
home should not turn on such irrelevant details. Likewise, it
makes little difference whether the government monitors a citizen by attaching a GPS device to her car or by tracking the car
with a lawfully operated drone. Yet the former would presumptively require a warrant, while the latter would be wholly unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.320 It is the constant monitoring of individuals, not the de minimis touching of a car, that
315. Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 320
(2016).
316. See id.
317. Id.
318. Protecting citizens’ privacy against arbitrary government intrusion is a
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“It is not the breaking of [a man’s] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property . . . .”); WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 766 (2009) (“Privacy was the bedrock concern
of the amendment, not general warrants.”); Cloud, supra note 66, at 1726 (noting that “the historical record suggests that objections to general warrants and
general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy,
property, and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions”); Davies, supra note 67, at 744–45 (arguing that “it is certainly the case that the Framers
intended to preserve a personal and domestic sphere that would be meaningfully protected against undue intrusions by government officers”).
319. See Baude & Stern, supra note 7, at 1882.
320. State laws may vary, but the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 suggests that touching a chattel without permission would be unlawful, even if the
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invades people’s privacy and raises concerns about government
oppression. But under a positive law test, only the touching matters.
A positive law regime would have the benefits of increased
legislative control over criminal procedure, such as institutional
competence and comprehensiveness.321 But an enhanced legislative role would also have significant drawbacks in the Fourth
Amendment context. A regime that significantly relies on legislative action to address new surveillance questions would likely
be systematically under-protective of privacy.322 The high and
growing enactment costs of legislation and the preferences of entrenched interest groups result in a powerful bias in favor of legislative inaction.323 Law enforcement agencies are likely to use
invasive surveillance technologies long before legislatures regulate them via statute.324
A core function of the Fourth Amendment is to limit the ability of the political branches of government to compromise citizens’ privacy.325 The positive law approach would eliminate such
limits so long as legislatures allow private parties as well as officials to engage in surveillance.326 Under the positive law model,
a determined government could permit its officials to engage in

owner could not maintain an action for damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 90607 (2014).
321. See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103
CAL. L. REV. 205, 23234 (2015); see also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment
and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801, 870, 875 (2004).
322. This is especially the case for surveillance techniques that do not fit
neatly into existing privacy tort categories, such as location tracking or the collection of communications metadata.
323. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE:
WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 24–26, 45 (2009); Tokson, supra note 13, at
193.
324. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor
Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 768–71
(2005). Likewise, statutes regulating evolving technologies tend to become obsolete quickly, and Congress has historically failed to amend such laws to accommodate technological change. See id.
325. See supra note 151.
326. See Re, supra note 315, at 33031. Re notes that citizens will often be
unable or unwilling to engage in such surveillance, and thus often do not present a substantial barrier to privacy-eliminating laws. Id.
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any type of surveillance without judicial check. Relatedly, a positive law approach could result in law enforcement and national
security interest groups lobbying for diminished protections
against private surveillance.327 This would both increase the
scope of permissible government monitoring and reduce existing
protections against intrusions by private parties.
Several other substantial objections to the positive law test
have been raised. Private intrusions and government investigations are very different, and the law has regulated them differently.328 Treating them as the same threatens to ignore the
greater harms of government investigation in many cases and
the greater justifications for government investigation in others.329 Depending on how it is applied, the positive law test might
also produce absurd results. For instance, a positive law approach may find a Fourth Amendment violation when a CDC researcher violates an FDA safety regulation while conducting a
blood test.330 Significant problems also arise in cases involving
data held by third parties.331 Ultimately, the fundamental arbitrariness and under-protectiveness of the positive law approach
make it an unappealing alternative to the normative model.
F. OLMSTEAD ALTERNATIVES
Justice Thomas’s dissent in Carpenter suggested an alternative approach to determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope,
grounded in text and historical practice.332 Thomas essentially
proposed returning to the rule of Olmstead v. United States,
which held that the Fourth Amendment only applied to the tan-

327. See id. at 329.
328. See id. at 32124.
329. See id.
330. See id. at 318.
331. Under the leading positive law approach, for example, it is difficult to
separate out uses of the government’s unique authority (which are searches)
from informal government coercion (which is not). See id. at 323. The government’s ability to obtain information held by third parties, perhaps the central
issue of modern Fourth Amendment law, would be largely determined by the
efficacy of informal pressure to persuade telecommunications service providers
to share data. See Tokson, supra note 13, at 191 n.307.
332. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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gible things mentioned in the Amendment: “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”333 Under this approach, as Olmstead ruled,
there would be no constitutional impediment to the government
wiretapping its citizens’ phone calls.334 Moreover, a citizen could
only assert a Fourth Amendment right in herself or her property
and would have no protectible interest in papers or property
owned by others.335 Justice Thomas’s approach has recently attracted some scholarly support.336
Perhaps the best argument against this approach was written in 1928, by Justice Brandeis in his influential Olmstead dissent.337 Brandeis noted that, in a world of constantly advancing
surveillance technology, a Fourth Amendment that only addressed the property-based surveillance common in the late
1700s would be “impotent and lifeless,” incapable of any meaningful protection of citizens’ rights.338 His warnings proved prescient in the decades following Olmstead, when the federal government engaged in a widespread and flagrantly abusive
program of bugging and wiretapping citizens, including civil
rights leaders, political activists, attorneys and their clients,
journalists, and members of Congress, among others.339 These
practices were declared unconstitutional only in 1967, when the
Supreme Court reversed Olmstead in Katz v. United States.340
333. Id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
334. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
335. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 224142 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This limitation on the Fourth Amendment’s scope is often framed as textualist, but the
text of the Fourth Amendment uses plural terms, referring to a right against
unreasonable searches vested in “the people” and “their” persons, houses, papers, and effects. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. While historical practice is consistent
with a Fourth Amendment limited to trespasses on an individual claimant’s
property, the text itself is consistent with a broader, collective right. See generally David Gray, Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 77 (2018) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was intended to
provide broader privacy protection than was recognized by late twentieth century Supreme Court rulings).
336. See Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming Nov. 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3309688 (arguing also on textual grounds that a “search” should be defined
as a reasonably detailed examination of something).
337. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 473.
339. See Tokson, supra note 5, at 58384.
340. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Tokson, supra note 5, at 584 n.13
(discussing the closure of the government’s wiretapping and bugging programs
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Indeed, the most substantial flaw of an Olmstead-like approach to the Fourth Amendment’s scope would be its lack of
protection against modern forms of surveillance. Under such an
approach, the government could constitutionally wiretap citizens’ phone calls, record their conversations taking place outside
the home, constantly track their locations via cell phone signal,
monitor their web surfing habits, monitor their television watching habits, record their search terms, analyze their urine, blood,
or DNA samples given to doctors or other parties, and obtain recordings inside their homes from internet-connected devices like
the Amazon Echo—all without a warrant or any quantum of suspicion.341 The Fourth Amendment would also not apply to government searches of non-residential real property, which is neither a “house” nor an “effect.”342 While most traditional methods
of surveillance and their analogues (such as email inspections)

in the late 1960s and their clear illegality thereafter). Congress passed a law in
1934 purporting to regulate wiretapping, but the legislation was narrow and
ineffective. See Tokson, supra, at 59192. A year after Katz was decided and
several decades after the advent of widespread government wiretapping, Congress passed the Wiretap Act, which (in addition to Katz) has effectively regulated government and private wiretapping. See Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 212.
341. See Bellin, supra note 336, at 58 (noting that the government could obtain recordings from any Amazon Echo so long as they obtain them from Amazon’s servers). Telecommunications companies and internet service providers
may have their own Fourth Amendment rights in user-related data. But users
would have no rights in such information, and the government could easily obtain it by request, subpoena, or other means. The heavily regulated companies
that control such data would have strong incentives to comply with government
requests, and users would have no constitutional standing to challenge any illegal searches. Cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980) (holding
that a bank customer lacked standing to challenge the government’s unlawful
theft of a bank employee’s briefcase containing documents relevant to the customer’s finances).
342. Although the Court has traditionally protected non-residential property
under the Fourth Amendment, it would presumably not be protected under Justice Thomas’s text-and-history-based approach. See Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 177 n.7 (1984) (noting that “[t]he Framers would have understood the
term ‘effects’ to be limited to personal, rather than real, property”); Maureen E.
Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property
Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 98287 (2016) (detailing how drafting history
and Founding-era sources indicate that “effects” are synonymous with personal,
chattel property); cf. Bellin, supra note 336, at 24–27 (noting the Court’s antitextualist precedents).
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would still be prohibited,343 numerous forms of modern surveillance would be unchecked by the Fourth Amendment.
To be sure, legislatures would eventually fill some of these
gaps.344 But legislative protections would necessarily be defeasible and non-constitutional, subject to rapid repeal if the political
winds were to change. Justifying a general shift away from constitutional protection and towards greater legislative control of
public policy would require a much broader theoretical argument
than advocates of Olmstead-based approaches have offered to
date.345
Moreover, legislative regulation of surveillance must overcome powerful institutional obstacles.346 It is likely to occur, if at
all, years or decades after new technologies are used to monitor
citizens.347 Yet legislation would be the only protection available
for most modern forms of information under Justice Thomas’s
approach. In short, an Olmstead-like regime is likely to be severely under-protective of citizen privacy relative to other approaches.
V. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL
The normative approach requires courts to overtly examine
the concrete benefits and harms of government surveillance.
This direct analysis will often clarify what the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test obscures. The normative approach can
resolve novel cases more effectively and clearly than the Katz
test, which struggles with new technologies and social practices.348 It can also provide a better foundation for cases with
sound outcomes but dubious rationales. Finally, the normative
model can reveal existing cases that are seriously flawed and
ripe for reversal.

343. Bellin, supra note 336, at 61.
344. Id. at 60.
345. Strong arguments along these lines have been made by scholars criticizing judicial review of statutes, although such arguments thus far have received relatively little traction outside of the academy. E.g., Jeremy Waldron,
The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
346. See supra notes 32224.
347. See supra notes 323, 340; see also Tokson, supra note 13, at 193.
348. See supra notes 22023 and accompanying text.
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A. DECIDING FRONTIER CASES
A primary virtue of the normative test is that it can resolve
with relative ease many cases that are difficult to assess under
the Katz regime. It decides cases involving new forms of surveillance effectively without bogging down in a futile inquiry about
societal expectations towards novel technologies. Indeed, the
Katz approach can leave Fourth Amendment protection for a
new technology unresolved long after its adoption by the general
public.349
Several decades after the popularization of email, the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the contents of emails
and other text-based electronic communications are protected by
the Fourth Amendment.350 Further, the leading appeals court
case on emails declined to reach a definitive ruling, instead holding that protection for emails is dependent on the specifics of
email service privacy policies and user agreements.351 The
Fourth Amendment would not apply, for example, to emails governed by a privacy policy that allows a service provider to inspect
or monitor a user’s emails.352 This echoed a previous en banc decision, which stated that “the expectation[ ] of privacy that computer users have in their emails . . . assuredly shifts from internet-service agreement to internet-service agreement,” depending on the specific terms of each agreement.353
Whether emails are protected under the Fourth Amendment
remains unresolved outside of the Sixth Circuit, and even in that
circuit, it is unknown whether third-party email services that
electronically inspect user emails strip those emails of Fourth
Amendment protection.354 The normative test would resolve
349. See e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (addressing infrared technology).
350. To be sure, dicta in Carpenter suggests that the Justices intuitively favor extending Fourth Amendment protection to emails. See Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). But the Justices have not assessed email
collection in any depth nor addressed the user agreements and electronic inspection issues that threaten to undermine Fourth Amendment protection for
emails.
351. United States v. Warshak (Warshak III), 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir.
2010).
352. Id.
353. Warshak v. United States (Warshak II), 532 F.3d 521, 526–27 (6th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
354. See Dana T. Benedetti, How Far Can the Government’s Hand Reach Inside Your Personal Inbox?: Problems with the SCA, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO.
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these open issues definitively. The harms to individuals of widespread government inspection of the contents of emails are potentially enormous. There would be a profound chilling effect on
both the volume and the content of personal communications,
especially intimate or controversial communications. The scope
and vigor of the ideas conveyed via email would decrease, political activism would be hampered, and personal relationships
would be harmed and, in some cases, substantially diminished.
At first glance, the law enforcement benefits of allowing the
government to read every citizen’s emails might also seem substantial, albeit not great enough to outweigh the enormous costs.
But the benefits to law enforcement may be far less extensive
than they initially appear. The vast majority of crimes—robberies, car thefts, drug crimes, murders, assaults, etc.—are unlikely to be discussed via email either before or after the crime.
The volume of intimate communications captured or chilled by
government observations would be exponentially higher than
the volume of emails remotely relevant to legitimate law enforcement. Moreover, there is an ironic benefit to law enforcement in
confining email observation to those cases where the police have
probable cause. In a world where the police review virtually everyone’s emails, even unsophisticated criminals will avoid discussing their crimes via email or take care to securely encrypt
their emails. By contrast, the currently low probability that any
given email will be read encourages criminals to occasionally use
email in the course of their crimes. The very difficulty of generating probable cause helps ensure that, when the police do have
probable cause, they often find evidence.355 For all of these reasons, the normative test would universally protect citizens from
the routine government inspection of personal communications,
rather than leaving them unprotected or basing protection on
the unread fine print of their software user agreements.
A similar analysis could be performed for newer technologies such as smart homes and voice-controlled home speakers
like the Amazon Alexa. The chilling effects and psychological
harms inflicted by government monitoring of in-home cameras
and microphones would be massive. The benefits to law enforcement would be dwarfed by such harms, and a substantial

TECH. & PRIVACY L. 75, 91 (2013).
355. See Minzner, supra note 181, at 92325.
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amount of criminal activity would simply be relocated to the
basement or the back yard.
B. FIXING CASES WITH UNSOUND RATIONALES
Many cases decided under the Katz test are poorly reasoned—full of incoherent statements about societal expectations
or unworkable standards that make a muddle of future cases.356
Yet many of the same cases reach sound or at least defensible
outcomes.357 The normative test can provide a more coherent justification of these outcomes and avoid the perils of expectationbased rationales.
For example, the Court in United States v. Miller held that
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to bank records, such as
checks and deposit slips, relating to an individual’s bank account.358 The Court dubiously asserted that customers lose any
expectation of privacy in their bank records because the records
are voluntarily conveyed to the banks and are “exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business.”359 This reasoning
has been criticized extensively.360 But the outcome of Miller, at
least as applied to account balances, checks, and deposit slips
rather than more revealing data like credit card purchase information, is defensible under the normative test and likely undeserving of reversal.
To summarize, allowing the government to access bank records is unlikely to harm interpersonal relationships or intimate
communications. There appears to be little in the psychological
literature on harmful effects of government scrutiny of one’s fi-

356. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting that infrared
scans of houses might be permissible were “the technology in question . . . in
general public use”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 21314 (1986) (finding
no reasonable expectation of privacy against overflight observation of the backyard of a home despite the homeowner enclosing the yard with high double
fences).
357. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
358. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
359. Id. at 442.
360. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 131314 (1981); Katherine
J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 662 n.247 (2011) (noting that
the Miller court might have been wrong in analyzing bank records as business
records of the banks).
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nances, although surveys indicate that people find it fairly invasive.361 The potential for substantial harm may be limited, however, as the information disclosed in one’s deposit slips, negotiable instruments, and account balances is unlikely to reveal
drastically more than citizens already reveal to the government
in the course of paying their taxes. Government scrutiny of bank
records may also chill certain legitimate activities in rare cases.
These might include the transfer of money to activist groups, foreign entities, or other lawful groups disfavored by the state.
These harms are non-trivial, albeit less profound than those at
issue in cases involving email searches or searches of the home.
Yet the criminal enforcement benefits of obtaining bank records
are substantial and unique. As the Court briefly noted in Miller,
bank records have a “high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
and regulatory investigations and proceedings.”362 White-collar
investigations are unique in that they typically lack physical evidence or neutral witnesses.363 A rule that law enforcement must
have probable cause before accessing financial records “would
end many white-collar criminal investigations before they had
begun.”364 Thus a court could hold that subpoenaing bank records other than detailed credit card records is not a Fourth
Amendment search, reasoning that such records are not especially sensitive and their benefits to law enforcement are extensive. The normative test provides a basis for Miller’s holding that
avoids the Court’s privacy-eroding rationale, which declared
that any sharing of information with a third party eliminates
Fourth Amendment protection.365
A similar rethinking could benefit cases like Kyllo v. United
States, which held that the infrared scanning of a house was a
Fourth Amendment search.366 Kyllo limited its holding to surveillance technologies that were not in “general public use,” as
people would presumably have no expectation of privacy against
361. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 133, at 73738 tbl.1. It was rated
as more invasive than questioning someone on the sidewalk for ten minutes,
but less invasive than searching a corporation’s computer. Id. The study did not
examine the harms of such surveillance, if any.
362. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1970)).
363. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 859–60 (2001).
364. Id. at 860; see also Kerr, supra note 71, at 509.
365. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 44243.
366. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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a technology that was widely used to observe or record their activities.367 The normative test could resolve the issue without the
ambiguous “general public use” limitation, on the basis that infrared scanning to detect activities occurring inside private
homes could cause serious harms and chilling effects on a variety
of private activities within the home, and the benefits of detecting mostly low-level drug crimes do not come close to justifying
such an intrusion.368
C. IDENTIFYING AND REVERSING FLAWED CASES
The normative approach can also identify existing cases that
are especially flawed and ripe for reversal. In California v.
Greenwood, for instance, the Court held that opening citizens’
trash bags left on the curb and examining their trash is not a
Fourth Amendment search.369 The Court reasoned that the defendants had no expectation of privacy because “[i]t is common
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a
public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public” and thus “respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”370
Although unsubstantiated claims about societal knowledge
might support the Court’s holding, the normative test does not.
A homeowner’s trash is especially revealing of the activities that
occur inside of a home, likely more revealing than the infrared
heat scan in Kyllo. If trash surveillance were to become widespread, the intimate activities of the home would be exposed to
the observation and judgment of others.371 Such observation can
lead to chilling effects or to significant psychological harm.372

367. Id.
368. See id. at 37 (noting that all activities occurring within the home are
intimate activities).
369. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
370. Id.
371. Trash inspection has not yet become widespread, but the government
could lawfully embark on a program to inspect every citizen’s trash at any time,
without legal check. As discussed above, previously unthinkable programs of
surveillance often arise as the costs of information collection and processing decrease. See supra note 240.
372. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 133, 73738 tbl.1; sources cited
supra notes 92, 130.
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Trash surveillance also threatens intimate relationships by exposing them to invasive scrutiny. The sexual and other intimacies of a home are revealed in its trash, and the relationships
involved may be deterred or diminished by outside observation.373
Even the considerable law enforcement benefits of examining citizens’ trash are insufficient to justify such invasive surveillance. In a world of pervasive trash inspection, criminals are
less likely to throw away incriminating documents or evidence;
the hassle of shredding or burning such evidence would be well
worth avoiding imprisonment.374 Even setting these dynamic effects aside, trash surveillance is likely to be most effective at detecting discarded drug paraphernalia, as in the Greenwood
case.375 Not only may there be less value in pursuing low-level
drug crimes, but police may be able to investigate more serious
drug-trafficking crimes by other means. The police in Greenwood, for instance, may have had probable cause to search
Greenwood’s house even without the trash inspection, having observed heavy vehicular traffic at night, cars visiting the house at
night for only a few minutes, and a truck that drove from the
house to a narcotics-trafficking location.376 The police might
have also generated additional proof by pulling over the visiting
cars based on reasonable suspicion of drug possession.377 In
short, the normative test counsels in favor of overturning Greenwood, an especially egregious application of the Katz test that
allows police to dig through any person’s trash without suspicion. The normative approach would protect the intimate details
of people’s activities inside their homes from arbitrary government scrutiny.
The normative model might also spur a rethinking of Arizona v. Hicks, where a divided Court held that moving stereo
equipment in order to view its serial number was a Fourth
Amendment search.378 It is likely that the de minimis harm
caused by such inspection is outweighed by the potential benefits
373. See Gerstein, supra note 111, at 268–69; Nissenbaum, supra note 113,
at 13839.
374. See supra text accompanying note 355.
375. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 38.
376. Id. at 37.
377. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
378. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987).
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of deterring crime and recovering stolen property, such that no
warrant should be required.
Finally, the normative approach may counsel rejecting the
emerging appeals court consensus that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that a user
visits while surfing the internet.379 These addresses can reveal
the content or at least the subject matter of the websites that a
user visits.380 Such surveillance is likely to deter legitimate internet communications and research, potentially stunting intellectual development and exploration.381 Further, the evidence
generated by such monitoring is likely to be weak and circumstantial, while evidence of internet-based crimes can likely be
generated through less invasive means.382
CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment law has undergone several dramatic
shifts over the course of its history, as courts have struggled to
preserve citizens’ privacy in the face of new surveillance practices and technologies.383 The Katz test was a particularly important shift. It allowed courts to regulate non-physical surveillance practices by focusing on people’s “reasonable expectations
of privacy,” rather than on property.384 But the test has been
deeply flawed from the start, and it is rightly criticized today as
incoherent, tautological, and arbitrary. Increasingly, as
379. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 9798 (2d Cir. 2017);
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008). IP addresses are
sequences of numbers assigned to each computer or other Internet-enabled device that is active on a network.
380. Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 214750 (2009).
381. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 65, at 389, 421; Marthews & Tucker, supra note 90, at 37.
382. For example, the police could obtain a warrant to capture the IP addresses that communicate with a website trafficking in child pornography or
selling illegal goods.
383. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment is limited to tangible things); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (declaring that the Fourth Amendment’s scope is not based
on physical intrusion but is determined by expectations of privacy); United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s
scope is also determined by trespass concepts); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409 (2013) (abandoning the trespass concept for a concept based on physical
touching and social norms).
384. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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knowledge of threats to privacy grows and an ever-greater proportion of our data is made accessible to third parties, societal
expectations are unable to serve as an adequate foundation for
the Fourth Amendment’s protections.
The normative test offers a better approach to determining
the Fourth Amendment’s scope. It is both more consistent with
the historical purposes of the Amendment and far more resilient
to social and technological change. Its factors capture the fundamental harms of government surveillance and are firmly
grounded in precedent and pragmatic surveillance theory. Further, its analysis is direct and transparent, avoiding false targets
and arbitrary distinctions. It is better able to address the widespread surveillance programs that increasingly pose the greatest
threats to citizen security. And it provides a superior method for
deciding frontier cases and resolving controversies about existing decisions.
The Supreme Court has been slow to adopt new Fourth
Amendment paradigms in the past. It took the Court nearly forty
years to overrule Olmstead v. United States,385 which ruled that
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to microphones or wiretaps. During those decades, the government engaged in a massive program of bugging and wiretapping private citizens.386 It
used these recordings to monitor and undermine political
groups, intimidate members of Congress, and threaten civil
rights leaders, among numerous other abuses.387 These abuses
did not come to light until long after the damage had been
done.388
Fourth Amendment law is in need of another paradigm
shift, one that will enable courts to protect privacy in a world of
ever-changing and expanding surveillance technologies. If history is any guide, the time for such a change is now. The normative test, like any legal test, has both advantages and drawbacks.
But in the world of modern surveillance, it offers the best way
forward for Fourth Amendment law.

385. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438 (1928).
386. See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 133, at 583.
387. Id.
388. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM., supra note 205, at 18385,
198201.

